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I. ABSTRACT 
Some two and a half years before the fatal shooting of Michael Brown 
by a Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer, the Indiana State Legislature 
enacted Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2 authorizing the use of force, including 
deadly force against public servants acting unlawfully against the persons 
or property of Indiana citizens.1  The statute, passed in March of 2012, is
* © 2015 Kindaka Sanders.  Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall 
School of Law, Texas Southern University. 
1. See IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2013). 
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the first of its kind.2  It was passed in reaction to the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in Barnes v. State, which abolished the common law right
to resist an unlawful arrest.3  Gun rights groups, most notably the National 
Rifle Association (NRA), responded in force, rallying against the abolition of
the right to resist an unlawful arrest and exhorting the Indiana State 
Legislature to expand gun-related rights.4  The result is a statute that not 
only re-instates the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest, but also 
expands gun-related defensive rights to an unprecedented degree.  This 
expansion includes the right to use deadly force against public servants in 
some situations that do not involve unlawful police violence.  As a result, 
many commentators argue that Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2 incentivizes 
violence against public servants. 
A Reason to Resist posits that, although Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2 is 
problematic for several reasons, it nonetheless, finds compelling constitutional 
support in terms of its core principals.  The Article also suggests that the 
use or threatened use of defensive force against rogue police officials may
also serve as a check on the type of police misconduct prevalent in many
minority communities; the type of police misconduct alleged most 
recently in the fatal shooting of teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, for example.
Furthermore, state laws, like Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2, that authorize 
the use of force, including deadly force against public servants, find 
compelling support in the United States Supreme Court’s most recent
interpretations of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. 
Heller5 and McDonald v. City of Chicago.6 This Article warns, however, 
that some aspects of the Heller and McDonald opinions, as evidenced by 
the Indiana statute, invite a dangerous degree of chaos into our system of
“ordered liberty and . . . justice.”7 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court determined that self-defense 
lies at the core of the Second Amendment.8  In  McDonald v. City of
Chicago, the Court established the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
2. The Indiana Law That Lets Citizens Shoot Cops, THE WEEK (June 13, 2012), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/229167/the-indiana-law-that-lets-citizens-shoot-cops [http://
perma.cc/7EQV-36MX]. 
3.  Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. 2011). 
4. Mark Niquette, NRA-Backed Law Spells Out When Indianans May Open Fire 
on Police, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 4, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-06-05/nra-backed-law-spells-out-when-indianans-may-open-fire-on-police.html [http://
perma.cc/8ARJ-9EKX].
5.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
6.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
7. Id. at 3034 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 571–73. 
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as a fundamental right applicable to the states.9  In doing so, the Court 
relied almost exclusively on the fundamental nature of self-defense itself.10 
The Court reasoned that since self-defense is a natural right, then it is a 
fundamental right.11  The Court further reasoned that self-defense lies at 
the core of the right to bear arms and that, as such, the right to bear arms
is also a fundamental right applicable to the states.12  The  Heller and 
McDonald opinions give cannon fire to gun rights groups to push for the
“constitutionally mandated” expansion of defensive rights to a level that
rivals or even exceeds the statutory defensive rights found in Indiana Code 
§ 35-41-3-2.13 The Court, however, failed to address the scope and limits 
of the right to self-defense as well as whether it would extend to third 
party defense. 
The constitutional right to defend third parties from unlawful government 
force may have some redeeming social value.  That is, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McDonald suggests that the primary reason why the 
Second Amendment was ratified was to ensure that citizens were armed
to resist potential government tyranny.  Said differently, the Second
Amendment was ratified in part to address the exact brand of governmental
tyranny alleged in the killing of unarmed Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri. So if the Second Amendment is to remain true to its roots and
if it is indeed justified by its purpose, then the threat of civilian force or 
the use of such force in response to unlawful police violence and oppression, 
should also work to check police misconduct in minority communities. 
A Reason to Resist attempts to remedy the gap left by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment as well as illustrates the 
applicability of the Second Amendment to minority communities.  In so 
doing, this Article offers a statutory model that secures a Second Amendment
right to use force against public servants in defense of others and, thus, 
maintains a check on unlawful government aggression while limiting the 
circumstances under which defensive force may be used against police 
officials. Additionally, A Reason to Resist explores Indiana Code § 35­
41-3-2 and other state laws permitting the use of defensive force against 
public servants. As such, it focuses on statutes and case law involving an 
9. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3023. 
10. Id. at 3036. 
11. Id. at 3036–37. 
12. Id. at 3036 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–600). 
13. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2013). 
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intervener’s use of deadly force against a public servant to defend an 
unrelated third-party.
Heller and McDonald establish a fundamental right to defend oneself 
against the unlawful use of force by anyone, including public servants. 
However, neither the Court’s decision in Heller nor McDonald address 
the situation where a third party uses force against a public servant in 
defense of a stranger. This Article, thus, proposes the concept of 
“defense-in-resistance” to describe the right to use deadly force in defense 
of a stranger. This concept of defense-in-resistance relies both on the self-
defense component of the Second Amendment and the Amendment’s 
implied right to rebel, in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of these issues.
II. INTRODUCTION 
On May 2, 1967, members of the Black Panther Party, a revolutionary
socialist organization, stormed the California State Capital with loaded
rifles and shotguns.14 At the time, in the State of California, it was legal 
to openly carry firearms in public places.15  However, the activities of the
Panthers were one reason the California State Legislature was considering 
a bill to eradicate this right.16  The Panthers entered the California State 
Capital in armed protest of the bill.17 
The Panthers originally started as a para-military organization created
to defend the African-American community from what the organization 
characterized as hostile police forces.18  The teachings of Malcolm X had 
inspired the Panthers, who described the use of arms in constitutional 
terms, suggesting that the Second Amendment gave black nationalists the 
right to defend their communities.19  The Panthers would routinely listen 
14. Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (July 24, 2011, 8:20
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[http://perma.cc/4JWE-PLNW].
 15. See Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads–1965 to 1985 (PBS 
television broadcast Jan. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Eyes on the Prize II]; Cynthia Deitle 
Leonardatos, California’s Attempts to Disarm the Blank Panthers, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
947, 969 (1999). 
16. Winkler, supra note 14. 
17. BOBBY SEALE, SEIZE THE TIME: THE STORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND
HUEY P. NEWTON 161–62 (1991). 
18. See Bridgette Baldwin, In the Shadow of the Gun: The Black Panther Party, the 
Ninth Amendment, and Discourses of Self-Defense, in IN SEARCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 67, 68, 73 (Jama Lazerow 
& Yohuru Williams eds., 2006); Leonardatos, supra note 15, at 957–59. 
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to police scanners to gather intelligence about police activity in the
community.20  They would then show up—armed with loaded rifles and 
their criminal codebooks—at places where police officials were conducting 
arrests and other investigations.21  The Panthers were essentially policing 
the police.22  This practice prompted California legislator, Don Mulford,
to introduce a bill calling for the repeal of the Act that allowed California
citizens to openly carry arms in public.23  The bill was passed and signed 
into law by then-governor Ronald Reagan.24  The passage of the bill took the
heart out of the Panthers’ police patrols and thus effectively ended them.25 
One of the questions presented by the Panthers’ police patrols is whether
there is a Second Amendment right to defend strangers from unlawful 
government force.  If there is such a right, then what is the origin, nature, 
and scope of the right? Under what circumstances would a third-party’s
use of deadly force against a police official provide a valid defense to a
charge of assault with a deadly weapon or murder? 
Although the context involving the Black Panther Party now seems 
remote, issues persist related to the third-party use of deadly force against
police officials. Two recent incidents in particular drive home the importance 
of addressing these issues.  On September 4, 2014, Levar Edward Jones 
pulled into a Circle K in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to this, as Levar 
closed in on the store lot, he removed his seatbelt in anticipation of 
alighting from his vehicle.26  As South Carolina Lance Corporal Sean Groupert
passed Levar he apparently peered into Levar’s window.  As a result,
Groupert pulled Levar over for a seatbelt violation.27 While Levar is standing 
outside of his vehicle in the Circle K parking lot, Groupert approaches and 
asks for Levar’s license.  Levar touches his back pocket, apparently 
20. Charles P. Pierce, The Ghost of Ronald Reagan, ESQUIRE POL. BLOG (Aug. 18, 
2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/Don_Mulford_Makes_History_Again 
[http://perma.cc/4F7Z-8NQP]. 
21. See, e.g., JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: 
THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 45–46, 55, 65 (2013); DAVID 
FARBER, THE AGE OF GREAT DREAMS: AMERICA IN THE 1960s 206–07 (1994). 
22. BLOOM & MARTIN, supra note 21, at 14, 55; Winkler, supra note 14. 
23. Leonardatos, supra note 15, at 970. 
24. See Act of July 28, 1967, ch. 960, 1967 Cal. Stat. 2459–63 (repealed 2012). 
25. See, e.g., Leonardatos, supra note 15, at 987. 
26. Ed Mazza, Sean Groubert, South Carolina State Trooper, Fired & Arrested





SANDERS PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2015 2:45 PM 














   

















looking for his wallet.28 Levar then reaches into the car to grab his
wallet.29  Groupert responds “Get out of the car!” Levar quickly complies
and begins backing away from the car.30  Groupert then opens fire on 
Levar, spending several rounds as Levar walks backwards with his hands 
raised high. Groupert eventually hits Levar in the hip.31  As Levar lay 
wounded on the ground, he entreats, “What did I do, sir?” Moments later 
Levar exclaims “I don’t know what happened, I just grabbed my license.”32 
The entire incident was caught on Groupert’s dashcam.33  Judging by the
video, the force used by the police was completely unwarranted. So, what
if, instead, a bystander comes to Levar’s defense? Imagine that in doing 
so, the third party shoots and wounds Groupert.  In the alternative, consider 
that the bystander kills Groupert.  What is the bystander’s criminal liability? 
The case of John Crawford III is also illustrative of these issues. On 
August 5, 2014, John visited a Dayton, Ohio Wal-Mart.34  As he talked on 
his cellphone to his mother and two children, he noticed a BB Gun, a
children’s air rifle that shoots small pellets or miniscule BBs.35  John picks
up the BB gun, which is out of the package and sitting on a shelf.36  He 
continues to walk around the store passing several customers who don’t
seem to react at all to the BB gun.37  He eventually, however, passes one
Ronald Ritchie who calls 911 and alleges that John is walking around the
store with a gun.38  When the police arrive, John is standing in front of a
shelf, talking on his cell phone, and fiddling with the BB gun.  The BB 
gun is pointed straight down at the floor.39  All of a sudden, police officers 
rush towards John shouting. In a matter of a second or so, they open fire.40 
John was pronounced dead at the hospital shortly after the shooting.41 The
entire incident was caught on store cameras.42  Imagine, as with the first 







 34. Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and
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killing them and saving John’s life in the process.  Does the Second
Amendment allow for this brand of defense?  Indeed the Supreme Court 
and some states have recently extended the Second Amendment analyses 
to possibly include a viable defense under these circumstances.  These 
recent developments, however, raise more questions than they solve. 
The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated militia, being necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed.”43  The United States Supreme Court, in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, interpreted this language to include the natural right 
of self-defense.44  However, the Supreme Court failed to address the question 
of whether and to what extent the Second Amendment embraces the right 
to act in defense of others, particularly in defense of others who share no
familial relationship with the intervener.  This question turns more on the
rationale behind the ratification of the Second Amendment than it does on 
the doctrine of self-defense, which historically does not embrace a right 
to defend strangers.45 
According to the Heller Court, one of the purposes behind the ratification 
of the Second Amendment was the protection of citizens from government 
tyranny.46  In other words, the ratifiers believed that the citizenry needed 
weapons to defend against potential government oppression.  In McDonald
v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court further highlighted the role of the 
Second Amendment in protecting citizens from government tyranny.47  In
deeming the Second Amendment a fundamental right, the Court accentuated
the Amendment’s role in ensuring that newly freed slaves were able to 
bear arms for defense against rogue southern law enforcement agents seeking 
to disarm them.48 
The Second Amendment, thus, arguably encompasses a right to rebel 
against tyrannical government action.49  Therefore, whether there is
a constitutional right to defend others depends on whether one is acting
in self-defense––by protecting a family member, an extension of oneself–
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
44.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
45. Marco F. Bendinelli & James T. Edsall, Defense of Others: Origins, Requirements,
Limitations and Ramifications, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 153, 153 (1995). 
46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 596–98. 
47.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036–38 (2010). 
48. Id. at 3038–42. 
49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 596–99; David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of
Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 648 (2008) (citing Heller, 
554 U.S. at 598). 
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–or whether one is acting in dual defense by defending a stranger from 
unlawful force while simultaneously rebelling against individual acts of
government tyranny, namely when a police officer uses unlawful force, in 
clear violation of his office, on a party unrelated to the intervener.50 
Under the theory of defense in resistance, the Second Amendment only 
guarantees an intervener the right to act in defense of a stranger if that 
stranger was suffering from unlawful government force and had the right 
of self-defense. 
Assuming a right to defend in resistance exists, what minimum statutory
provisions would suffice to insure the right?  In April 2012, then Governor
of Indiana, Mitch Daniels, signed into law a bill that explicitly authorizes 
the use of force, including deadly force, against public servants.51  The 
statute, Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2 is the only one of its kind.  It is
controversial to say the least.  The provisions of Indiana Code § 35-41-3­
2 far exceed what would be necessary to ensure the constitutional right to 
use deadly force in defense against police officials.  In fact, it could be
argued, as many opponents of the statute have, that the statute, as written, 
encourages violence against public servants.  For instance, one provision
of the statute permits an intervener to use deadly force against a police 
official, even when a police official acts lawfully.52  This is the case where
the intervener reasonably, but wrongfully, believes that deadly force is 
necessary to protect the stranger from serious bodily injury.53 
While the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment 
establishes that there is a right to use defensive force against public 
servants, the Supreme Court has failed to provide any guidance regarding 
the contours of such a right.  The Supreme Court has, thus, opened the 
door for laws such as § 35-41-3-2 of the Indiana Code.  This Article attempts 
to tighten the door, leaving it cracked enough only to admit the light of 
the Constitution.  The Article does so by (1) providing a limiting principle
regarding the right to rebel and (2) offering a statutory model that limits 
the circumstances under which individuals can use defensive force against
public servants. 
In summary, this Article discusses the controversial right of third-party 
intervention in situations involving citizens being subjected to deadly 
police force. The Article focuses on the use of deadly force to protect
 50. Tim George, Indiana First State To Allow Citizens To Use Force Against Law 
Enforcement Officers, OFF THE GRID NEWS (June 13, 2012, 7:14 AM), http://www.offt
hegridnews.com/2012/06/13/indiana-first-state-to-allow-citizens-to-use-force-against-law- 
enforcement-officers [http://perma.cc/9FKN-FDGJ].
 51. Niquette, supra note 4.
 52. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i) (2013). 
53. Id. 
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strangers.  It posits that the defense-of-strangers is protected by the Second 
Amendment, but suggests that the standard to be applied in evaluating the 
legality of the intervener’s actions should be based on actuality, rather
than reasonability.  In other words, the Article suggests, contrary to the 
Indiana statute, that in order for a valid defense to exist, the intervener 
must be correct in his or her belief that the assaulted citizen had the right 
to use deadly force in his or her own defense. 
The Article is broken down into eleven parts.  As background, Part II 
will briefly outline the relevant portions of common law self-defense and
defense of others doctrines.  To introduce the constitutional basis for the
theory of defense in resistance, Part III will discuss self-defense as a 
constitutional right and examine the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller 
and McDonald.54  In examining the extent to which the Second Amendment 
embraces a right to defend others, Part IV will examine the legal theory
behind the common law defense of others doctrine and the modern-day
evolution of the doctrine. Part V will discuss defense of relatives as a 
constitutional right.  Part VI will discuss the use of force against police officials,
including a discussion of the Indiana statute authorizing the use of force 
against police officials.  Part VII will discuss the contours of the right to
rebel and its current constitutional status as well as the theory of defense­
in-resistance.  Part VIII will discuss the phenomenon of unlawful police 
violence in minority communities and the need for defense-in-resistance 
to help address the problem of police brutality.  Part IX will outline a 
statutory model for defense-in-resistance and discuss the policy implications
of the right to defend in resistance.
III. BACKGROUND ON DEFENSIVE FORCE 
Generally,  person may use reasonable force to defend themselves  or 
herself against an unlawful attack, if he or she is without fault in provoking 
the violence. Both the use of force and the degree of force used must be 
necessary.55  That is, the force has to be proportionate to the threat, and 
the threat has to be immediate.56  Thus, shooting an assailant who threatens
to “punch you in the face” if you do not “stop looking at him” is unnecessary, 
54.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
55. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception 
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L.  REV. 367, 377 (1996). 
56. Id. 
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because shooting surpasses a punch.57  Shooting the assailant is also 
unnecessary because the threat is not immediate; it has a condition 
precedent, continued staring.58 A defender can only use deadly force when it
reasonably appears to the defender that an assailant has threatened them
with the imminent use of unlawful, deadly force.59 
In addition to the right of self-defense, an individual may, under certain 
circumstances, use force on behalf of another person.60  The defense of 
others doctrine reflects the notion that the right to defend oneself is, at
least partially, transferrable to a third party.61  The defense of others doctrine 
holds that a citizen may use physical force in defense of another, if it 
reasonably appears that the assaulted citizen has a right of self-defense.62 
Thus, if Jill is attacking Jack and Rebecca walks by, observes the assault,
and kicks Jill in the chest to stop Jill from attacking Jack, Rebecca may 
have a legitimate defense, irrespective of whether Jack actually had the 
right to defend himself.  That is, if Jill was, in fact, using force lawfully 
against Jack when Rebecca intervened––Jack had attacked Jill first–– 
Rebecca would still be innocent of assault if her intervention was reasonable
under the circumstances. 
The doctrines of self-defense and defense of others have entrenched 
roots in the common law; courts have historically considered them either
common law or statutory defenses.63 Because every state has a self-
defense doctrine and, to a much more limited extent, a defense of others 
doctrine, the issue has never been broached regarding what would happen 
if a state abrogated the law of self-defense or defense of others and a
citizen of that hypothetical state acted in self-defense but was nevertheless 
convicted. The issue on appeal would turn on whether or not self-defense 
is a constitutional right irrevocable by the state.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
Since the constitutional right to use deadly force to defend a stranger
from unlawful police violence relates in great part to individuals’
constitutional rights to defend themselves, the Article will discuss the 
constitutional basis for the right of self-defense.  The Second Amendment 
to the Constitution states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the 
57. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (5th ed. 2010). 
58. Id.
 59. Lee, supra note 55, at 380–81. 
60. Shelby A.D. Moore, Doing Another’s Bidding Under a Theory of Defense of
Others: Shall We Protect the Unborn with Murder?, 86 KY. L.J. 257, 288–89 (1998). 
61. Id. at 271. 
62. Id. at 273. 
63. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 5. 
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security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall
not be infringed.”64  Courts have read this language as embracing two 
distinguishable rights: the right to self-defense and the right to rebel.65 
The right to self-defense, of course, is a broad-based right to protect oneself 
and one’s family from unlawful force, irrespective of the identity of the 
aggressor. The right to rebel, on the other hand, only contemplates the use of
force to resist tyrannical government action. 
The United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
established the individual’s right to self-defense as the core of the Second 
Amendment.66 Heller involved a District of Columbia law that effectively 
banned the ownership of handguns.67  The law not only made it a crime to 
carry an unregistered handgun, but it also prohibited the registration of 
handguns.68  The law also prohibited the carrying of a handgun without a
license, but authorized the chief of police to issue one-year licenses.69  In
addition, the law required the functional incapacitation of non-prohibited 
firearms, such as rifles and shotguns, through disassembly or trigger lock,
if kept in the home for non-recreational activities.70 
The respondent in Heller, a special police officer, attempted to register
a handgun that he planned to keep at home.71  The District of Columbia 
denied his registration.72  Heller filed a lawsuit, asserting that the registration 
requirement, the licensing requirement, and the trigger-lock requirement
as they related to the maintenance of firearms within the home violated 
his Second Amendment rights.73  The D.C. Circuit held that the handgun 
ban and the trigger-lock requirement violated the Second Amendment 
because these provisions undermined the right to self-defense.74 
The Supreme Court in Heller interpreted the Second Amendment as 
conferring an individual right to bear arms for self-defense as opposed to 
a collective right to bear arms in connection with the military.75 This
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
 65. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–85 (2008). 
66. Id. at 628. 
67. Id. at 574–75. 
68. Id.




 73. Id. at 575–76. 
74. Id. at 576. 
75. Id. at 584–85. 
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interpretation is crucial to understanding the right to rebel as an individual
right, exercisable by individuals against individual government agents.76 
The Heller Court reached its conclusion that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right by conducting a textual analysis of the
Second Amendment and by examining various historical sources interpreting 
the Second Amendment, including legislatures, scholars, and courts.77 
With reference to the text of the Second Amendment, the Court reasoned 
that the Second Amendment language, “the right of the people,” was 
always associated with individual rights,78 and it concluded that at the
time of the founding to “bear arms” meant to carry firearms in anticipation 
of confrontation.79  The Court noted that state constitutions using the phrase 
“bear arms” also included language suggesting that the right to bear arms 
was for the purpose of self-preservation as well as for the common defense 
of the state’s sovereignty.80  In the Court’s words, “These provisions
demonstrate—again, in the most analogous linguistic context—that ‘bear 
arms’ was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia.”81 
The Court, next, turned to the historical background of the Second 
Amendment.82  It began with the premise that the Second Amendment 
codified a “pre-existing” right of self-defense.83  The Court explained that
the English common law right providing the basis for the Second Amendment 
was understood at the time to be “an individual right protecting against 
both public and private violence.”84 
The Court supported its interpretation of the Second Amendment by 
citing historical episodes in England leading to the right to bear arms.85 
Two similar episodes occurred during the reigns of King Charles II and 
James II.86  Both monarchs quelled political dissent by disarming their 
political adversaries.87  As a result of such episodes, Englishmen became
extremely suspicious of any government efforts to regulate firearms.88 
The English Bill of Rights, thus, included a provision both prohibiting the
disarming of English Protestants and allowing the bearing of arms for 
76. Id. at 594. 
77. See id. at 576–628. 
78. Id. at 593–94 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *139–40).
 79. Id. at 592. 
80. Id. at 585. 
81. Id. at 585–86. 
82. Id. at 592. 
83. Id.
 84. Id. at 594. 
85. Id. at 592–95. 
86. Id.
 87. Id.
 88. Id. 
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purposes of self-defense against the English Crown.89  The Framers of the 
Bill intended to protect an individual’s right to bear arms in the event of 
confrontation.90  The natural right to preserve and defend the self, a right 
disconnected from military service, lay beneath this English right.91 
The Court’s historical analysis also focused on the experience of early
American colonists with the British Crown.92  During the period between 
1760 and 1770, the British Crown began to confiscate colonists’ arms in
the most intransigent regions of the country.93  At the time of the ratification
of the Second Amendment, antifederalist members of Congress feared
that the federal government would duplicate the tyranny of the British 
Crown by disarming the citizenry, in order to further a particularized world-
view enforced by military rule.94  Because of these and other experiences, 
Americans historically perceived the right to bear arms as an individual
right to keep arms for purposes of self-defense.95  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court in Heller determined that the framers ratified the Second Amendment
to stop the federal government from disarming the citizens.96  The framers 
deemed an armed citizenry necessary as a check on oppressive government 
action—and to overthrow the federal government itself if necessary to 
protect state sovereignty.97 More particularly, the Court held that the right
to bear arms to defend against government oppression revolved around 
the natural right of self-defense.98  Thus, the Court determined that the
right of self-defense is a “central component” of the right to bear arms.99 
While Heller established self-defense as a constitutional right, the Supreme
Court of the United States in McDonald v. City of Chicago100 established 
self-defense as a constitutional right, fundamental to the nation’s notions of
liberty and justice, and, thus, applicable to the states as well as to the federal
government.101  In McDonald, a group of Chicago residents brought suit
 89. Id. at 593 (citing Declaration of Right 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 7 (Eng.)). 
90. Id. at 594. 
91. Id. at 593–94 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *139–40). 
92. Id. at 594–95. 
93. Id. at 594. 
94. Id. at 598. 
95. Id. at 603. 
96. Id. at 599. 
97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. Id. 
100.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
101. Id. at 3042, 3046. 
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challenging city ordinances that effectively banned the possession of 
handguns by demanding registration of handguns and then prohibiting the
registration of most handguns.102  The Court found that the right to self-
defense provided the basis for the Second Amendment and reasoned that 
since self-defense is a fundamental right, the right to bear arms for the 
purposes of self-defense was fundamental as well and, thus, applicable to 
the states.103 
At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the Second Amendment,
as well as the entire Bill of Rights, applied only to the Federal government.104 
Eventually, beginning in the late 1800s, the Supreme Court began to view 
certain rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights as so important, so much a 
part of the American legal fabric, that these rights also protected citizens 
from state action.105 
The Supreme Court decreed that a right contained in the Bill of Rights
is fundamental if it forms an essential part of our nation’s particular
“scheme of ordered liberty” and system of justice or if it has deep roots 
“in this Nation’s history and tradition.”106 Applicability to the states relies
on three factors: (1) the composition and breadth of the right, (2) the types 
of activity that constitutes a violation of the right, and (3) the justification 
for the right.107 
In holding that the right of self-defense, and by extension the right to 
bear arms, was a fundamental right, the Court in McDonald focused on 
the natural right of self-defense.108  The Court found that self-defense is a
fundamental right because it is a natural, basic right, highly regarded at
the time of the ratification of the Second Amendment.109  Based on this,
the Court rationalized that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right 
because Americans consider the gun to be “the quintessential self-defense 
weapon.”110  In examining the historical record, the Court determined that
the country’s “system of ordered liberty” demanded the rights bestowed 
under the Second Amendment.111
 102. Id. at 3026. 
103. Id. at 3042–3046. 
104. Id. at 3028. 
105. Id. at 3031, 3034. 
106. Id. at 3036 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). 
107. Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal 
Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 1205, 1207 (2009). 
108. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042, 3046. 
109. Id. at 3036–37. 
110. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)). 
111. Id. at 3042. 
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The Court recapped the history of the right to bears arms starting with 
the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which clearly sets forth a right to maintain 
arms for self-defense.112  The Court also discussed the reaction of the
American colonists to King George III disarming particular rebellious 
colonies in the mid to late 1700s.113  The Court further cited the ratification 
debates of 1788, where antifederalist legislators expressed a pervasive 
fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to
impose military rule.114  In those debates, the federalists essentially agreed 
that the right to bear arms was fundamental, but argued that limiting the 
power of the federal government adequately protects it.115 
The Court in McDonald also highlighted that several states had adopted 
provisions analogous to the Second Amendment around the time of
ratification.116  Additionally, the Court quoted Blackstone, who declared 
that the right to bear arms was one of the quintessential English rights.117 
The Court further noted that, 
By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the Second
Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Government would 
disarm the universal militia—had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right 
to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense.118 
The Court offers several historical anecdotes in support of the proposition 
that the self-defense rationale underlying the Second Amendment continued 
to hold sway in the public imagination after initial fears prompting the
Amendment abated.119 
One anecdote the Court offered involved freed slaves.  The Court cited 
legislation passed in the wake of the Civil War to protect the rights of 
freed slaves.120  Tens of thousands of African-Americans who had served 
in the Union Army returned to the South after the war.  As a result, several
 112. Id. at 3036 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–94). 
113. Id. at 3037 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95). 
114. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598). 
115. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–99). 
116. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 600–03). 
117. Id. at 3036 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94). 
118. Id. at 3038. 
119. Id. (citing EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 33, 40 (1871) (describing laws of
Alabama and Florida)). 
120. Id. at 3039–40 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27–30); see 
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Freedmen’s Bureau Act and the Conundrum over Whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L.  REV. 683 (2002). 
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states took organized efforts to disarm them under the cover of law.121 
Some states passed statutes explicitly prohibiting African-Americans 
from possessing firearms.122 
In response, Congress included provisions re-asserting the right to bear
arms in two notable pieces of legislation.  The first, Section 14 of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866—an Act passed to assist the transition of 
African-Americans from slaves to free citizens—explicitly states that the 
“the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by
all the citizens.”123  Congress also enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
bestowing on all citizens the benefit of the laws enjoyed by white citizens.124 
While the Act made no explicit mention of the right to bear arms, the 
Court in McDonald found that Congress clearly intended to include that 
right.125 
The Court also cited the congressional debates surrounding the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as evidence of the continued relevance of
the right to bear arms for personal defense.126  In those debates, Senator
Samuel Pomeroy declared that the freedom of Americans requires the 
right to bear arms, proclaiming that every man “should have the right to 
bear arms for the defense of himself and family and his homestead.”127 
Lastly, the Court cited congressional debates surrounding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 wherein “Congress routinely referred to the right to 
keep and bear arms and decried the continued disarmament of blacks in
the South.”128  Furthermore, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, most states had adopted constitutional provisions protecting 
the right to bear arms.129  The Court summed up its discussion of the 
fundamental nature of the right to bear arms by stating that “it is clear that 
the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right 
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our 
system of ordered liberty.”130  While the Supreme Court in in McDonald 
and Heller clearly established the constitutional right of self-defense, the 
Court did not address the question as to whether an individual has a 
constitutional right to act in defense of another, particularly in the absence 
of a familial connection.
 121. Id. at 3040 n.23. 
122. Id. at 3040. 
123.  Freedmen’s Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866). 
124. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3041–42. 
125. Id. at 3040–41. 
126. Id. at 3041–42.
 127. Id. at 3041. 
128. Id. at 3041–42. 
129. Id.
 130. Id. 
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V. DEFENSE OF OTHERS 
The United States Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald clearly 
established self-defense as a fundamental right.  The Court, in those cases,
determined that the scope of the self-defense doctrine at common law 
strongly suggests that Americans also have a constitutional right to use 
force in defense of family members.  However, the Court has not determined 
whether the Second Amendment also covers acting in the defense-of­
strangers. The defense of others doctrine as a constitutional right has received 
little, if any, attention from courts and scholars.  The defense of others doctrine 
has its origins in the common law.131  Most states recognize the defense
in some form or fashion.132 
The Maryland Court of Appeals provided the best summary of the 
American common law defense of others doctrine in Guerriero v. State.133 
The court commented 
A third person, closely related to or associated with one attacked in such a manner 
that he could properly have defended himself by the use of force, has a right to 
go to the defense of the person attacked and to use the same degree and character
of force that the one attacked could have used.134 
The American common law defense of others doctrine evolved from the 
English common law.  However, early English common law provides no 
discernible right to act in defense of others.  The right to defend family
members evolved in the English common law over time.135  Initially
American common law also limited the defense of others doctrine to family 
members.136  Gradually, however, states began to expand the doctrine to
include strangers.137  The change began in the 1960s with the adoption of
the Model Penal Code.138  The drafters stressed the importance of mens 
rea in imposing criminal liability.139  Thus, doctrines that would hold a
 131. Moore, supra note 60, at 270–73. 
132. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 133 (1984 & Supp. 2011). 
133.  Guerriero v. State, 132 A.2d 466, 466 (Md. 1957). 
134. Id. at 468. 
135. Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 882 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), aff’d, 451
A.2d 664 (Md. 1982) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3; ROLLINS M. 
PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1018–19 (2d ed. 1969)). 
136. Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 45, at 155 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *3).
 137. Id. at 156. 
138. Id. at 154, 160. 
139. Id. at 160. 
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person who lacked moral blameworthiness criminally responsible fell into 
disfavor.140 
According to some sources, most notably William Blackstone, the privilege 
of using force in defense of family members was not an extension of the 
doctrine of self-defense; rather, it arose out of the right to defend property.141 
According to Blackstone, the privilege of using force rested on the vested
interest in the defended party.142  However, most American case law
frames the doctrine in terms of self-defense. 
Most states currently have defense of others statutes similar to the
Model Penal Code’s approach.143  The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides
in Section 3.05 on the “Use of Force for the Protection of Other Persons:” 
1.	 Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09,
the use of force upon or toward the person of another is
justifiable to protect a third person when: 
a. the actor would be justified under Section 3.04 in using 
such force to protect himself against the injury he believes 
to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; 
and 
b. under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, 
the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified 
in using such protective force; and 
c. the actor believes that his intervention is necessary for 
the protection of such other person.144 
Under the MPC’s defense of others doctrine, the intervener’s criminal 
liability depends on his or her perception of the events giving rise to the 
intervention.145  The MPC also limits the intervener’s criminal liability to 
their degree of mental culpability.146  For example, a jury may not convict 
an intervener of murder if he or she negligently intervenes and causes the 
death of the perceived assailant.  The death could only be criminally negligent 
homicide or reckless homicide.  However, if the intervener reasonably
believed that the perceived victim had the right to use deadly force in self-
defense, then they would be justified in using deadly force, even if they
 140. Id.
 141. Id. at 155. 
142. Id. at 156–57. 
143. Id. at 198. 
144. Id. at 160–61 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Official Draft 1962 with Revised Commentary 1985). 
145. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of Statutes Justifying 
the Use of Force To Prevent the Use of Force Against Another, 71 A.L.R.4th 940, § 2[a] 
(1989).
 146. Id. § 7.
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were wrong in their  belief and the perceived victim did not in fact possess 
the right to act in self-defense.147 
Most modern jurisdictions follow, more or less, the standards of the 
MPC in determining the circumstances under which an intervener may
use physical force for the protection of another.148  These state codes
assess the intervener’s actions in terms of reasonability.149  Under most
modern criminal codes, an intervener must be reasonable in the belief that 
the use of force was necessary, and that the force used was proportionate 
to the threat. The intervener must also reasonably believe that the danger
to the perceived victim is imminent.  Two parts comprise the reasonability
standard: the intervener must actually believe that force is necessary and 
proportionate and that the threat is immediate, and this subjective belief 
must be objectively reasonable based on the intervener’s point of view.150 
A minority of states require that deadly force be actually necessary in 
the defense of others, not merely reasonably necessary.151  These state
statutes would hold the intervener criminally liable if they wrongly 
believed that deadly force were necessary, even if reasonable people 
would have drawn the same conclusion.  This doctrine is called the “alter 
ego rule.” 
The alter ego rule, provides that an intervener who acts in defense of 
another acts at his or her own legal risk.152  That is, if the intervener is
wrong in his or her belief that the defended party has the right of self-
defense, then the intervener stands to be convicted.153 
The common law alter ego rule currently makes up the minority view 
of the defense-of-strangers doctrine.154  The majority view provides only 
that the intervener’s sincere belief that the perceived victim has the right 
of self-defense be reasonable.155  In other words, under the majority view, 
the intervener can be wrong, and still use the defense. 
The alter ego rule began to draw criticism because it allowed courts to 
convict interveners without guilt of mind or mens rea and discouraged 
147. Id.
 148. Id. §§ 2–5. 
149. Id. § 2.
 150. Moore, supra note 60, at 278, 284–86. 
151. Id. at 273–74, 281. 
152. Id. at 273–74. 
153.  Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 45, at 159–60. 
154. Id. at 159. 
155. Id. at 159–60. 
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citizens from coming to the aid of victims of crime.156  Now, nearly all 
states have statutes vindicating interveners who act reasonably even if 
incorrectly.157 
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Alexander v. State,158 appropriately
framed the problem with the “alter ego rule” in the following passage: 
In the decade that commenced with the assassination of President Kennedy, 
climaxed with the creation of this Court, and concluded with the marriage of Tiny
Tim, violence proliferated, partly because police were constitutionally hobbled in
controlling a rebellious reaction and partly because citizens were reluctant-or
afraid-to become “involved” in deterring that violence. This reticence seemed to
emanate less from fear of physical harm than from the potential consequences of 
a legal aftermath. 
Representative was the 1964 New York homicide of Catherine “Kitty” 
Genovese, who was viciously ravaged and repeatedly stabbed while onlookers
turned their backs to avoid witnessing the butchery, and neighbors closed their
doors and windows to shut out her screams of anguish until her suffering was finally
ended by the murderer. Witnesses who were interviewed excused their
indifference by noting that the law did not protect a protector from criminal 
assault charges if the one he aids was initially in the wrong, however misleading 
appearances may have been. . . .  The onlookers hesitated to become involved in
the fracas at their legal peril. Even if their hearts had been stout enough to enter
the fray in defense of a stranger being violently assaulted, the fear of legal 
consequences chilled their better instincts.159 
The alter ego rule is nearly extinct.160  However, the alter ego rule remains
a valuable option when citizen intervention is discouraged.  This may be 
the case when a public servant is the object of the defensive force. Here,
as will be discussed, legal policy should encourage hesitance, both because
of the potential danger to the intervener and the necessary presumption 
that the officer is operating within the law. 
The majority of states that currently have statutes codifying the defense 
of others doctrine do not distinguish between defense-of-strangers and 
defense of relatives. A few states however distinguish the two doctrines. 
The Vermont defense of others statute, for example, reads as follows:
If a person kills or wounds another under any of the circumstances enumerated
below, he or she shall be guiltless: (1) In the just and necessary defense of his or
her own life or the life of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, sister, 
master, mistress, servant, guardian or ward.161
 156. Id.
 157. See People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319, 319 (N.Y. 1962). 
158.  Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 880 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
159. Id. at 881. 
160.  Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 45, at 159. 
161. 13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305(1) (2014). 
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This Vermont statute retains the common law limitation that the defended 
party must be a close relation. 
VI. DEFENSE OF RELATIVES AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the question of whether
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to act in defense of others.  It 
has, however, implied that the Amendment guarantees the right of persons 
to act in defense of family.162  In discussing Washington, D.C.’s band on 
handguns, the Court in Heller asserted:
The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a 
prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelming choose for
the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the 
Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition––in the 
place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is
most acute––would fail constitutional muster.163 
The Court implies, of course, that inhibiting the defense of family— 
and, for that matter, property—violates the Second Amendment. 
A review of the text of the Second Amendment and the common law 
defense of relative’s doctrine, combined with a historical examination of 
the doctrine of self-defense reflects a limited constitutional right to act in
defense of one’s householders, but not in defense-of-strangers. 
The notion that self-defense is a natural right preceding the existence of 
positive law underlies the Supreme Court’s holding that the Second
Amendment reflects the right to self-defense.164  It follows that whether
defense of family is also a natural pre-existing right bears on whether the 
Second Amendment guarantees it.  Early English common law did not
speak of a right to defend the family, which suggests that it is not a pre­
existing right.  However, parents have a natural instinct to protect their 
children and spouses may have a similar instinct to protect one another. 
As a historical matter, many of the sources on which the Court relies to
treat self-defense as a quintessential right make no distinction between
defense of family and defense of self.  For example, the Court in Heller 
implied citizens have a right to act in defense of family members by
quoting an 1866 editorial, in the Loyal Georgian which reads: “All men,
 162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962 with
Revised Commentary 1985). 
163.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 571 (2008). 
164. Id. at 632. 
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without distinction of color, have the right to keep and bear arms to defend
their homes, families or themselves.”165  The McDonald Court also cited 
congressional debates around the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and a statement from Senator Pomeroy describing as “indispensable” an 
individual’s “right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family and 
his homestead.”166 
The Heller Court also implicated a constitutional right to act in defense 
of family in response to a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer.  Justice 
Breyer argued the District of Columbia could restrict firearms under the 
constitution because of various founding-era restrictions on gun possession 
that, in Justice Breyer’s words, “impose a burden upon gun owners that
seems proportionately no greater than restrictions in existence at the time 
the Second Amendment was adopted.”167 In response, the majority stated 
that 
. . . we do not think that a law imposing a 5-shilling fine and forfeiture of the gun
would have prevented a person in the founding era from using a gun to protect 
himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so the law would be enforced
against him.168 
VII. THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE AGAINST POLICE OFFICIALS 
Professor Darrell A. H. Miller, in his groundbreaking article, Retail
Rebellion and the Second Amendment, poses the question of whether a 
civilian has a constitutional right to take the life of a public servant in self­
defense.169 The common law treated a public servant acting unlawfully no
differently from any other law-breaker.  Thus, the doctrine of self-defense 
and defense of others applied equally to civilians and police officials.170 
State courts have since abridged some common law uses of force against 
public servants but all states permit citizens to use force to combat
unlawful police force in some instances.171  States have, to some extent, 
correlated the type and range of defensive force they allow to the type and 
range of police aggression exerted. 
Three broad categories of unlawful police aggression exist: limited 
force used to complete an arrest, excessive force in conducting an arrest, 
and gratuitous police force or extrajudicial assault.
 165. Id. at 615. 
166.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3041–42 (2010). 
167. Heller, 554 U.S. at 714 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. at 633–34. 
169. Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 
939, 939 (2011). 
170. Id. at 947–48. 
171. Id. at 952. 
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The first type of police aggression occurs when a police official arrests 
a citizen. This type of police force consists of the minimum amount of 
force necessary to make the arrest, including but not limited to handcuffing 
the suspect. This type of force puts a suspect at no real risk of physical 
injury; it primarily affects the arrestee’s liberty interest.  The second 
category of force, excessive force, occurs when the police use more force 
than necessary to accomplish an end within the scope of his authority. 
These ends include making arrests, both lawful and unlawful.  The 
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment applies to claims of
excessive force.172  Courts examine the totality of the circumstances of a
given situation to assess the reasonableness of police force.  Factors include 
the severity of the alleged crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate 
danger to either the officers or the members of the public, and whether the 
suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to flee.173 
The third category of police force, gratuitous police force or extrajudicial 
assault, occurs when a police officer wholly abdicates his or her role as a 
public servant. This happens when a police officer attacks a citizen for no 
lawful reason, such as when a police officer gets angry with a citizen for 
an unquestionably lawful act such as staring, and attacks the citizen as a 
result.174 
The common law allowed a person to use whatever force was necessary 
to resist an unlawful arrest.175  The justification for the use of force under 
these circumstances revolved around the doctrine of provocation as well
as the notion that one had a right to use physical force to defend against 
encroachment on liberty interests and certain dignity interests.  English
common law deemed unlawful arrests an offense to the Magna Carta 
itself.176  As such, unlawful arrests understandably provoked the passions
of the arrestee as well as any onlookers.  In other words, under English 
common law, a suspect could resist an unlawful arrest solely due to its 
injustice. 
The Queen v. Tooley, an English common law case, first established the 
provocation justification.177  In Tooley, a constable arrested Anne Dekins
172.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
173. Id. at 396.
 174. Miller, supra note 169, at 947–48. 
175. Id. at 948. 
176. Id. at 950. 
177.  The Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 352; 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 1301. 
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for incontinency—unchaste behavior, lewdness, and promiscuity.178  The
constable, however, had no warrant for Dekins’ arrest.179 While he escorted 
Dekins back to the prison, three men approached the constable, who drew 
their swords and demanded Dekins’ release.180  Interestingly, the unlawfulness
of the arrest alone motivated the men’s intervention; they did not know 
Dekins.181  The constable escaped and got Dekins to prison.182 However, 
the same sword-bearers accosted the constable later, demanding Dekins’
release.183  When the constable called out for help, a civilian, James Dent, 
came to his aid.184  Tooley, one of the sword-bearers, killed Mr. Dent in 
the struggle.185  A lower court convicted Tooley of murder, the King’s
Bench overturned on appeal.186  The court held that under the circumstances, 
Tooley could have at most committed manslaughter because Dent’s death
resulted from provocation by the unlawful arrest of Dekins.187  The court 
explained that “if one be imprisoned upon an unlawful authority, it is a 
sufficient provocation to all people out of compassion; much more where 
it is done under a color of justice, and where the liberty of the subject is 
invaded, it is a provocation to all the subjects of England.”188 
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the English common law right to 
resist an unlawful arrest in 1900 in John Bad Elk v. United States.189  In 
John Bad Elk, law enforcement officials attempted to arrest John Bad Elk, 
a Native American law enforcement agent, for allegedly shooting his gun 
in the air.190 The incident began when Captain Gleason, the ranking 
reservation law enforcement officer, heard a gunshot.191  Gleason confronted 
Bad Elk to determine whether he had fired the shot, and Bad Elk admitted
to shooting his gun in the air for fun.192  Captain Gleason then asked Bad 
Elk to come to his office to discuss the matter.  When Bad Elk did not 
show up, Gleason ordered three reservation police officers to go and arrest
him.193  However, the attempted arrest was unlawful because Bad Elk’s
 178. Id. at 349.
 179. Id. at 349–50. 






 186. Id. at 349, 352–53. 
187. Id. at 352–53. 
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alleged offense of shooting in the air was not a crime.194  Furthermore, 
even if it was a crime it amounted only to a misdemeanor and the law at 
the time required a warrant to arrest a person for a misdemeanor not 
committed in the presence of the police.195 
The officers found Bad Elk at his place of residence, and he refused to 
return with them to the office.196  The officers left but returned the next 
morning to convince Bad Elk to come to the agency.197  According to Bad 
Elk, he eventually asked the officers why they were “bothering” him.  One 
officer responded “You are a policeman, and know what the rules are.” 
Bad Elk replied “Yes, I know what the rules are, but I told you that I would 
go to the Pine Ridge agency in the morning.”198  At this point, the officer
nudged forward and made a gesture towards his weapon.199  When Bad
Elk saw the officer’s gun he shot him down.200  The officer died within 
minutes.201 
A jury convicted Bad Elk of murder in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of South Dakota.202  The trial court had instructed 
the jury that Bad Elk had no right to resist an unlawful arrest and that the 
arresting officers could use all force necessary to secure the arrest.203 
In reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court took issue with the jury instruction, 
holding that the unlawful arrest mitigated Bad Elk’s action and downgraded 
his offense to manslaughter.204  The Court also implied that Bad Elk would 
be innocent of any crime, if he reasonably believed the officer was going 
to shoot him.205 
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in John Bad Elk and dicta in another 
opinion positing that “[o]ne has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful 
arrest,”206 most states moved away from the common law right to resist 
an unlawful arrest following the adoption of the MPC in 1961.  The MPC 
194. Id. at 536–37. 
195. Id. at 535. 
196. Id. at 531. 
197. Id.
 198. Id. at 531–32. 
199. Id. at 533
 200. Id. at 532–33. 
201. Id.
 202. Id. at 530. 
203. Id. at 533–34. 
204. Id. at 534. 
205. Id. at 537–38. 
206.  United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1947). 
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not use such force: 
 resistance to unlawful arrests by providing that actors may 
(i)	 to resist an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace 
officer, although the arrest is unlawful.207 
The drafters of the MPC reasoned that resisting an unlawful arrest was 
unjustifiably dangerous and that various alternatives existed to remedy the 
injustice.208  As Craig Hemmers, in his article Resisting Unlawful Arrest 
in Mississippi: Resisting the Modern Trend, points out, “Eventually courts 
took cognizance of the academic assaults on the right, and began to adopt
the position of the critics of the right.”209 
The case of State v. Valentine illustrates the modern trend abrogating 
the common law right to resist and explains the popular concern behind 
the right’s abrogation.210  The defendant, Valentine, was standing on a
corner in downtown Spokane, Washington.211 Police Officer Rick Robinson 
saw him wearing a black coat and believed him to be suspicious, so Robinson 
called another officer, Moore, to help identify Valentine.212  Valentine got 
in an automobile and drove off.213  According to Officer Moore, he followed 
Valentine in an unmarked vehicle, until Valentine committed the traffic 
infraction of failing to signal.214  Officer Moore then attempted to pull
Valentine over by flashing his headlights and honking his horn.215  Valentine
eventually pulled over and Officer Moore, along with several other police 
cruisers, pulled behind Valentine.216  The versions of events differ markedly 
from this point on.217  According to Moore, when he asked Valentine for
license and registration, Valentine asked why and commented “‘you . . . 
cops are just harassing me.  I’m Black, and I’m tired of the harassment.’”218 
Valentine eventually provided his license and registration, and Moore 
allegedly wrote a citation for failure to signal, which Valentine refused to 
sign.219  At some point, as Valentine attempted to retrieve something from
 207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962 with
Revised Commentary 1985). 
208. Id., note at 42–43. 
209. Craig Hemmens, Resisting Unlawful Arrest in Mississippi: Resisting the Modern 
Trend, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 2, ¶ 21 (2000). 
210.  State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294, 1294 (Wash. 1997). 
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his car, Officer Moore and another officer grabbed him.220  The police officers 
allege Valentine punched Officer Moore in the side of the head.221  The
officers engaged Valentine, forced him to the ground, and handcuffed 
him.222  At the jail, the nurse supervisor refused to admit Valentine because
of the severity of his injuries, and Valentine was taken to the hospital.223 
At trial, Valentine contested the legality of the arrest, arguing that he 
did in fact signal his turn by using hand signals.224  Valentine also contended 
that the officer punched him first and he only used force in self-defense 
and as a reasonable means to prevent his unlawful arrest.225 Valentine
was convicted of assaulting a police officer.226  On appeal, Valentine
took issue with the trial court’s jury instruction on the use of force in 
resisting an unlawful arrest.227  The instruction reads as follows: 
A person unlawfully arrested by an officer may resist the arrest; the means used
to resist an unlawful arrest must be reasonable and proportioned to the injury
attempted upon the party sought to be arrested. The use of force to prevent an 
unlawful arrest which threatens only a loss of freedom, if you so find, is not 
reasonable.228 
Valentine argued on appeal that the jury instruction was wrong because 
it suggested that one could not use force in resisting an arrest that only
threatens a loss of freedom.229  Valentine argued that, contrary to the
instruction, the state allowed reasonable and proportionate force to repel 
an unlawful arrest even without a threat of physical injury to the arrestee.230 
In holding that a suspect could not resist an arrest that only threatens 
their freedom, the Washington Supreme Court cited arguments made by 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code and other scholars who favored the 
abrogation of the right.231  The court cited scholarship that pointed to the
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justification of the English common law right to resist an unlawful arrest.232 
The court cited the vast improvement of prison conditions in America and
the addition of procedural safeguards as reasons to abridge the common
law right.233  When the Tooley ruling was issued in 1710, arrestees faced 
inordinately long terms of confinement in awaiting trial, often shackled.234 
Unsanitary prison conditions, including the lack of sewage facilities,
meant the heightened chance of contracting deadly diseases and the lack
of in-prison medical facilities meant the festering of illnesses.235  Physical 
torture and the lack of nourishment also added to the chances that any
extended incarceration in Tooley, England was a death sentence.236 
The court in Valentine, in overturning the common law right to resist an
unlawful arrest, also relied on the argument that technological advances in
weaponry make it difficult to successfully resist an unlawful arrest and
increase the chances that resistance will result in the injury of the arrestee.237 
Due to these types of rationales only a minority of states retain the common
law right to resist an unlawful arrest.238  A majority of states actually make
it statutorily illegal to resist.239 
While most jurisdictions have abrogated the common law right to resist 
an unlawful arrest, most jurisdictions, it seems, have retained the common
law privilege of an individual to use force in defending against excessive 
police force.240 Dag Ytreberg describes when a citizen may defend against 
excessive police force:
One who, after being attacked by [an officer], “has reasonable ground to believe, 
and in good faith does believe, that his life is in danger, or that he is likely to
suffer great bodily harm, has a right to meet any attack being made upon him, or
which he has reasonable ground to believe is being made upon him, in such a way 
and with such force as under the circumstances he at the moment honestly believes,
and has reasonable ground to believe, is necessary to save his own life or protect 
himself from great bodily harm.”241 
This conception of defending against excessive police aggression applies
almost universally.  However, only one state specifically authorizes the 
232. Id. at 1300–01. 
233. Id. at 1301. 
234. Id. at 1300. 
235. Id. at 1301. 
236. Id. at 1300–01. 
237. Id. at 1304. 
238. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Right To Resist Excessive Force in Accomplishing
Lawful Arrest, 77 A.L.R.3d 281, § 2[a] (1977). 
239. Id. 
240. Andrew P. Wright, Resisting Unlawful Arrests: Inviting Anarchy or Protecting 
Individual Freedom?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 387–88 (1997); Ytreberg, supra note 238, §
2[a]. 
241. Ytreberg, supra note 238, § 2[b]. 
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use of force against public servants.242  The State of Indiana enacted a statute 
in June of 2012 allowing citizens to use defensive force, including deadly
force, against police officials.243  The statute provides as follows: 
A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if the 
person reasonably believes the force is necessary to: 
(1) 	 protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably
believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force; 
(2) 	 prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry of or attack on the 
person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle; or
(3) 	 prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful trespass on or criminal 
interference with property lawfully in the person’s possession, lawfully in 
possession of a member of the person’s immediate family, or belonging to
a person whose property the person has authority to protect.244 
The statute further notes that 
(k) 	 A person is not justified in using deadly force against a public servant 
whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a public servant 
unless: 
(1) 	 the person reasonably believes that the public servant is: 
(A) acting unlawfully; or
(B) not engaged in the execution of the public servant’s official duties; and
(2) 	 the force is reasonably necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the 
person or a third person.245 
The Indiana statute seems to authorize the use of force against police 
officials in all circumstances wherein the law permits an individual to use 
force against a civilian.246  In this way, the statute essentially reverts back 
to the common law’s treatment of defensive claims against police officials,
whereby police officials who acted unlawfully were treated no differently 
from any other assailant.247  Indiana made the statute law in June of 2012 
242. Mark Niquette, Indiana Law Lets Citizens Shoot at Police, SFGATE (June 6,
2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Indiana-law-lets-citizens-shoot-at­
police-3612347.php [http://perma.cc/JD48-ZDXM].
 243. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(k) (2013). 
244. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i) (2013). 
245. Id. § 2(k).
 246. Id.
 247. Id.; John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1900); Stephen
Michael Ian Kunen, Comment, Superhuman in the Octagon, Imperfect in the Court Room:
 723 
SANDERS PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2015 2:45 PM 
























and it met with considerable criticism.248  Much of the criticism claimed 
that the law would lead to the intentional targeting of public servants and 
would increase the risk of danger in an already perilous profession.249 The
state’s prior abrogation of the common law right to resist an unlawful
arrest, which many believed left citizens vulnerable to police tyranny, 
made the law passable.250 
As mentioned above, all states allow citizens to use reasonable force 
against police officials to stave off the threat of death or severe bodily
injury.  The common law permitted a citizen to use reasonable force against 
a police officer who was employing force only when the police officer 
was threatening basic bodily injury.251 The common law, however, limited
the amount of force employable against police officials to the amount of 
force required to inhibit the excessiveness of the police force.252 
A few states, in addition to Indiana, maintain the common law rule 
allowing defensive force to repel police force when that force only threatens 
minor bodily injury.253  For the most part, these are the states that have not 
abrogated the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest.  The District
of Columbia, for instance, permits self-defense against a police officer if 
the officer used excessive force and the defendant responded with force 
that was “reasonably necessary” for self-protection considering the
surrounding facts.254 
Indiana courts, even before the 2012 statute, permitted individuals to
use force against excessive police force that only threatened basic bodily
injury.  The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Shoultz v. State, held that although
unlawful arrest did not mitigate Shoultz’s actions, excessive police force 
did.255 
In Shoultz, an Indiana police officer, Officer Mayhew, followed the 
motorcyclist to the Grim Reaper motorcycle club.256  Shoultz, the manager
of the establishment, came out of the clubhouse and reprimanded the 
officer for following the motorcyclist onto club property.257  Officer Mayhew
Assessing the Culpability of Martial Artists Who Kill During Street Fights, 60 EMORY L. 
J. 1389, 1395 (2011). 
248. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2013); Niquette, supra note 242. 
249. Niquette, supra note 242; The Indiana Law That Lets Citizens Shoot Cops, supra 
note 2.
 250. Niquette, supra note 242. 
251.  John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1900). 
252. Id.
 253. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (West 2011). 
254.  Nelson v. United States, 580 A.2d 114, 117 (D.C. 1990). 
255. Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
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257. Id. 
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then ordered Shoultz to be quiet and return to the clubhouse.258  When 
Shoultz refused to go back into the clubhouse and continued to yell at
Mayhew, Mayhew attempted to place Shoultz under arrest by asking him 
to put his hands on the wall.259 
Shoultz temporarily complied but when he did not keep his hands on 
the wall, Mayhew sprayed him with pepper spray.260  Shoultz still refused 
to keep his hands on the wall, at which point Mayhew threatened to hit
him with his long metal flashlight.261  When Shoultz again refused to follow
orders, Mayhew hit Shoultz twice with the flashlight––once in the back
of the leg and once in the head––causing Shoultz to fall to the ground and
bleed excessively from the head.262  Mayhew then called an ambulance and
for back-up officers.263  The back-up officers arrived and assisted Mayhew 
in placing Shoultz in handcuffs and leg shackles.264  While under restraint,
Shoultz kicked Mayhew once in the shin.265 Among other offenses, Shoultz
was charged and convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer and 
resisting arrest.266 
On appeal, Shoultz argued that Mayhew’s use of excessive force against 
him justified his use of force in resistance.267  The Indiana Court of Appeals
first noted that Indiana did not retain the common law right to resist an
unlawful arrest.268  However, the court instead assessed the lawfulness of 
Shoultz’ conduct using the law of resisting excessive force as opposed to 
the law of resisting an unlawful arrest.269 The court then went on to find 
that the officer had used excessive force under the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard.270 
The Indiana Court of Appeals highlighted the fact that Shoultz never 
threatened the officer with force or violence; that no other persons created
a potential threat to Mayhew, which might have triggered in him reasonable 
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apprehension; that Mayhew used the pepper spray and flashlight without
being physically threatened; that Mayhew never told Shoultz that he was 
under arrest and had not tried to handcuff Shoultz before resorting to 
force; that the crime for which Mayhew was attempting to arrest Shoultz 
was a misdemeanor offense.271  The court also reviewed the police
department’s standard operating procedures, noting that Eighth Circuit 
precedent made police department guidelines relevant to the analysis of 
unconstitutionally excessive force.272  The guidelines authorized the use 
of force in situations where civilians resist, but limited the use of force to
the amount necessary to overcome physical resistance.273  The guidelines
specifically cautioned against blows to the head using a metal flashlight 
unless such force was necessary.274 
The Indiana Court of Appeals overturned Shoultz’s conviction, concluding 
that because Mayhew had used excessive force in the prior affray, then 
Shoultz’s response in kicking Mayhew in the shin was reasonable.275  The
court noted that Shoultz could use force so long as the force was not
disproportionate under the circumstances.276  The court’s analysis did not 
turn whatsoever on the type of injury the excessive police force caused or 
threatened.277 
Conversely, other jurisdictions, such as the state of Washington, only
allow defensive force if excessive police force threatens serious bodily 
injury.  In State v. Westlund, the defendant, Westlund, and others were charged 
with second degree assault following a battle royal of sorts with police 
officials.278  Westlund argued that he acted in self-defense when officers
used excessive force in attempting his arrest.279 
Westlund was having a party at his home that included minors drinking 
beer.280  Officers were called to the scene.281  When they arrived they advised 
Westlund that he was under arrest for contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor.282  One of the officers then pulled Westlund’s arm down and placed 
a handcuff on it.283  Westlund responded by stating that he would go 
271. Id. at 824. 
272. Id.
 273. Id.
 274. Id. at 824–25. 
275. Id. at 825. 
276. See id.
 277. See id. at 824–25. 
278. See State v. Westlund, 536 P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
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peacefully.284 A defense witness testified that at this point Westlund was 
not putting up a fight.285  She said, “[H]e was dropping his hands and trying 
to keep them from trying to grab a hold of him.”286  One officer, then, struck 
Westlund’s hand with a hard blow, and Westlund, along with the arresting 
officers, fell to the ground.287 
A witness testified that at one point three or four officers were on top 
of Westlund.288  A co-defendant, Vonhof, testified that he and another person
pulled two of the officers off of Westlund whom had been “beating him 
up for maybe 10, 15 seconds.”289  After the affray, one witness described 
Westlund’s face as looking like hamburger, adding that he was spitting up 
large amounts of blood.290  Westlund was convicted but appealed his
conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on
self-defense.291 
The Washington Court of Appeals upheld the conviction finding that 
“an arrestee’s resistance of excessive force by a known police officer,
effecting a lawful arrest, is justified only if he was actually about to be 
seriously injured.”292  The court also added that a party using defensive force 
to combat excessive police force acts at his own peril.293  That is, if it is
later determined that the arrestee was not, in fact, facing serious injury, 
then his use of force is deemed unjustifiable.294 
The Washington Court of Appeals in Westlund summed up the general 
policy concern underlying limiting defensive force to situations where 
excessive force threatens death or serious bodily injury:
We emphatically do not countenance a use of force by police which exceeds that 
essential to effect an arrest, but the arrestee’s right to freedom from arrest without
excessive force that falls short of causing serious injury or death can be protected
and vindicated through legal processes, whereas loss of life or serious physical 
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The court went on to add that: 
[I]n the vast majority of cases, as illustrated by the one at bar, resistance and 
intervention make matters worse, not better.  They create violence where none 
would have otherwise existed or encourage further violence, resulting in a 
situation of arrest by combat.  Police today are sometimes required to use lethal 
weapons for self-protection.  If there is resistance on behalf of the person lawfully
arrested and others go to his aid, the situation can degenerate to the point that
what should have been a simple lawful arrest leads to serious injury or death to
the arrestee, the police or innocent bystanders.296 
So the rationale behind limiting defensive force in these types of cases 
approximates the reasoning underlying the abridgment of the common law
right to resist an unlawful arrest.  Many jurisdictions also place additional 
qualifications on the use of defensive force against police officials.297  The
most important restrictions are as follows: once an officer ceases to employ
excessive force any defensive force must also cease.298  Also, a person 
subjected to a lawful arrest must “desist from the continued use of force 
against the arresting officer if the arrestee knows or has reason to know 
that the use of excessive force on the part of the officer will cease if the 
arrestee desists from resisting.”299  In some instances, if the defendant’s
actions provoked the use of excessive force, then he or she may not forcibly 
resist.300 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly considered the question of 
whether citizens can use deadly force in defending against unlawful police 
force. However, in John Bad Elk, the Court implied that the defendant 
could have used deadly force against police officers who were about to 
use deadly force against him.301  At common law, a citizen had the right 
to use deadly force against a police official using unnecessary, deadly force 
in effecting a lawful arrest.302  Most states have not abridged this common 
law rule.303 
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Mullis v. State, reaffirmed
the common law tradition of permitting citizens to use deadly force when
 296. Id.
 297. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(h), at 159 nn.89– 
90 (2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2014–2015). 
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Perez, 90 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (Ct. App. 1970). 
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Moreira, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Mass. 1983). 
300. See e.g., State v. Robinson, 253 S.E.2d 311, 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). 
301.  John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900). 
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41 S.W. 294, 297 (Ky. 1897). 
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an officer attempts an arrest in a manner that unjustifiably threatens the 
arrestee’s life, even where the arrest is lawful.304  In Mullis, a police officer 
used his service weapon to affect a misdemeanor arrest, and the defendant 
responded with deadly force.305  The court observed that 
If an officer making a lawful arrest merely for a misdemeanor committed in his
presence did so in an unlawful manner by making an unprovoked assault with a 
weapon likely to produce death, and with intent to kill the offender, such as would 
constitute a felony under statute, or if the circumstances were sufficient to excite 
the fears of a reasonable man that such a felony was intended, and the offender
killed the officer, not in a spirit of revenge or for the purpose of preventing the 
lawful arrest, but to protect himself from what was or what reasonably appeared
to be such a felonious assault, then, in either of such events, the killing would be
justifiable homicide.306 
In Vann v. State, the defendant shot a police officer after the officer
attempted to affect an arrest by firing at the defendant with his sidearm,
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled her use of deadly force in
defense justified.307 
Furthermore, a 1974 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case, Rodriguez 
v. State, also illustrates the continuity of the common law rule regarding 
the use of force in defending against excessive police force.308  Luis Fuentes
was driving a car occupied by Rodriguez and other passengers when the 
car was pulled over by a police cruiser.309  Officers Cullar and Lee made
the stop alleging a defective taillight.310  The officers then asked the occupants
to alight from the vehicle.311  According to Rodriguez, after he got out of
the car, he saw Officer Lee push the driver, Fuentes, and reach for his 
pistol.312  Rodriguez, then, afraid that Officer Lee would shoot both he and 
Fuentes, took the gun from Officer Lee.313  Seeing this, Officer Cullar, 
shot at Rodriguez twice, wounding him with the second shot.314 Rodriguez 
fired in response, wounding Officer Cullar.315  Rodriguez was convicted 
304.  Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91, 98 (Ga. 1943). 
305. Id. at 98. 
306. Id. 
307.  Vann v. State, 77 S.W. 813, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903). 
308.  Rodriguez v. State, 544 S.W.2d 382, 383–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). 






 315. Id. 
729 
























of deadly assault on a police officer after the trial court refused his request
for a jury instruction on self-defense.316  The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed the convictions essentially holding that Rodriguez’ 
version of events supported an acquittal on the grounds of self-defense.317 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court describes the least legally problematic 
case for using deadly force which arises when “a police officer’s on-duty
conduct has become so flagrantly divorced from any legitimate law 
enforcement function that she no longer may be deemed to be acting 
within the scope of her appointed office.”318 
One of the most renowned cases falling into this category began on the 
evening of November 19, 1986.319  Twenty-seven New York City police 
officers went to the apartment building of Larry Davis, a twenty-year old 
reputed drug dealer living in the Bronx.320  The officers purportedly wanted 
to question Davis regarding the execution-style murder of four drug 
dealers, and the search led to his sister’s apartment.321  The officers had 
no arrest warrant, and Davis had not officially been named as a suspect in
any crime.322  The police officers entered the apartment wearing bulletproof 
vests and armed with shotguns and handguns.323 
The police entered the apartment and Davis sought refuge in a dark 
bedroom along with his sister’s two children.324  At some point, one or
more of the officers fired into the bedroom.325  Davis then returned fire, 
alternating between a sixteen-gauge sawed off shotgun and a .45-caliber
semi-automatic pistol, ultimately wounding six of the seven officers.326 
As a result, the officers went for cover, taking several shots as they retreated.327 
Davis managed to slip out of a back window unscathed.328 
Police officials tracked Davis down seventeen days later following a 
city-wide manhunt and an anonymous tip placing Davis at his mother’s 
316. Id.
 317. Id. at 384. 
318.  Commonwealth v. Montes, 733 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
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apartment in the Bronx.329  The scene of the arrest was a media spectacle
replete with reporters and crowds of onlookers.330 As the police approached, 
Davis took several hostages but eventually surrendered because he believed 
the presence of reporters assured his safety.331  Davis was charged with 
several counts of attempted murder.332  At trial, he argued that he shot the
officers in self-defense and that the police raid was really an assassination 
attempt.333  According to the Defense, Davis had knowledge of extensive
police involvement in the distribution of drugs, and those involved wanted 
him permanently silenced.334  The mostly black jury acquitted Davis of all
of the attempted murder charges as actions taken in self-defense.335 One 
of the jurors interviewed reported that the jury believed the defense’s 
version of the events, including the suggestion that the officers had come 
to assassinate Davis.336 
The African-American community hailed Davis as a folk hero of sorts.337 
Many African-Americans regarded him as “a symbol of resistance” 
because “he fought back at a time when African-Americans were being 
killed by white police officers.”338  This attitude is shared by many in the
African-American community concerning the police in general.  As will
be discussed, unlawful police violence has historically been more pronounced
in the African American community.  As argued below, members of
329. Todd S. Purdum, Friends Helped Davis To Stay in Shadow, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
7, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/07/nyregion/friends-helped-davis-to-stay-in­
shadow.html [http://perma.cc/UL2U-2M7J]. 
330. Robert D. McFadden, Cornered in Manhunt, Davis Surrenders in Bronx, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 7, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/07/nyregion/cornered-in-manhunt­
davis-surrenders-in-bronx.html [http://perma.cc/AJ5R-8NDV].
 331. Id.
 332. Id. 
333. William G. Blair, Jury in Bronx Acquits Larry Davis in Shooting of Six Police 





 336. Id. 
337. Samuel G. Freedman, To Some, Davis Is ‘Hero’ Amid Attacks on Blacks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 2, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/02/nyregion/to-some-davis-is­
hero-amid-attacks-on-blacks.html [http://perma.cc/ZP4K-S8S6]. 
338. Robert D. McFadden, Slain in Prison, but Once Celebrated as a Fugitive, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/nyregion/22davis.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7EVK-TN7H]. 
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minority communities are in greater need of the defense of self-defense 
and by extension defense-in-resistance.
While the law concerning the use of deadly force against police officials 
in self-defense is relatively developed, the law regarding the third party
use of force against police officials is slim.  The Queen v. Tooley provides 
the historical foundation for the third-party use of force.339 Tooley involved
three strangers using deadly force to liberate a woman wrongfully arrested
for sexual impropriety.340  The King’s Bench held that the unlawful arrest 
“provoked” the killing and thus mitigated the interveners’ murder charge
to manslaughter.341  The Tooley court also provided the historical precedent 
for the common law alter ego rule when it held that the strangers intervened 
in the situation at their own risk, that if they had been wrong and the arrest 
was lawful, then they could not have used the defense of provocation.342 
Section 35-41-32 of the Indiana Penal Code provides the clearest and, 
simultaneously the most controversial legal pronouncement regarding the 
use of force against public servants in defense of others.  Section 35-41­
32 provides, in essence, that an intervener may come to the aid of the 
perceived victim of unlawful police aggression and may, under certain
circumstances, use deadly force to protect a third party, even a stranger, 
from excessive police force.343  The Indiana law does not embrace the
common law alter ego rule.  In Indiana, an intervener can kill a police officer 
who lawfully uses deadly force against a third party and go free, if the 
intervener reasonably believes that the third party had the right to use 
deadly force! 
The states are split in terms of the circumstances under which an 
intervener may use force in defending another from excessive police force. 
The case law on this issue is sparse.  In 1997, the Supreme Court of Nevada, 
in Batson v. State, in an issue of first impression, held as a matter of state 
law that an intervener can use force against a police officer in defense of 
another party when the intervener witnessed the excessive use of police 
force.344  The court stated that: 
[A] person may defend another only where that person has witnessed a police 
officer’s unlawful and excessive use of force, and only where the individual being
“rescued” is facing imminent and serious bodily harm at the hands of the police 
officer. Furthermore, an individual acting in defense of another against a police 
339.  The Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349; 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. 
340. Id. at 349–50. 
341. Id. at 350. 
342. Id. at 353. 
343. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2013). 
344. Batson v. State, 941 P.2d 478, 483 (Nev. 1997). 
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officer may only use that force reasonably necessary to remove the threat of
imminent serious bodily harm to that other person.345 
The Batson court essentially adopted a more stringent version of the 
alter ego common law rule.  So in Nevada, an intervener’s actions must meet 
four criteria to exonerate him or her under the state’s defense of others 
doctrine: 
1.	 The intervener must be a first hand witness to excessive police aggression;
2.	 The police aggression must threaten imminent and serious bodily harm 
to the defended party;
3.	 The intervener can only use the degree of force necessary to stop the
threat of serious bodily harm; 
4.	 The defended party must have in fact had the right to defend himself or
herself. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. French 
articulated a similar standard.346  Police arrested French for aggravated 
assault following an altercation on a street corner in the Frankford section
of Pennsylvania.347  According to the prosecution’s evidence, when Officer 
Welsh arrived on the scene he saw four white individuals beating an
African-American male, who was pinned to the ground.348  Officer Welsh 
pulled Defendant French and three others off the man.349  French told the
officer that the man had attacked her and her companions first.350  She  
stated that the man had been with a group of people who were harassing 
a couple at a nearby bus stop.351  She further remarked that the man 
assailed them when her companions demanded that the group cease the 
harassment.352 Conversely, the man who had been pinned to the ground 
stated that he was walking down the street to go catch a bus when French
and her companions attacked him without provocation.353  The man  
reported that he did not want to file charges and the officer allowed him 
to leave.354
 345. Id. (citations omitted). 
346.  Commonwealth v. French, 611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992). 





 352. Id. 
353. Id.
 354. Id. 
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Officer Welsh then commanded French and the others to leave, but they 
refused and began to shout profanities at him.355  The boyfriend of French’s
sister called the officer a “nigger lover.”356  According to the officer, after 
the boyfriend of French’s sister made this remark, the boyfriend punched
him in the face.357  Officer Welsh responded by punching the boyfriend,
at which point French’s boyfriend punched Welsh.358  Officer Welsh placed 
French’s boyfriend and the other male present under arrest.359  According 
to French, one of the officers had his foot on her boyfriend’s throat and 
was choking him to the point that she thought he was going to die.360 
French punched Officer Welsh in the face; he then placed her under arrest.361 
French was tried and convicted for aggravated assault and resisting arrest.362 
French appealed the conviction, arguing, in part, that the trial court’s
jury instruction regarding the use of force against police officials was 
erroneous.363  The instruction stated: 
[I]n this case justification is a defense if the defendant French reasonably believed
that her intervention was necessary to protect Moran [appellee’s boyfriend] from
death or serious bodily injury and that the force used was immediately necessary
to protect Moran against the force used by Officer Welsh on the same occasion
as Miss French used force. Because the Commonwealth has the burden of
disproving the defense of justification, you may find Miss French guilty only if
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt either that French did not reasonably
believe that her intervention was necessary to protect Moran or that she did not
reasonably believe that the force she used was immediately necessary to protect
Moran then and there against the force used by Officer Welsh.364 
French took issue with the statement that she could only defend her 
boyfriend if she reasonably believed that he was facing serious bodily 
injury or death.365 French argued that her reasonable belief that her boyfriend 
was facing bodily injury justified her action.366  In other words, she argued 
that “the use of force by an arresting officer which exceeds the force 
required to effectuate the arrest amounts to an assault on the arrestee which 
triggers the right of self defense.”367  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania













 367. Id. at 178. 
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excessive force capable of causing less than serious bodily injury or death 
can be vindicated by recourse to subsequent legal remedies.”368 
Although most states have no statutory provisions specifically permitting 
the use of deadly force on public servants, the case law permits the force 
under certain circumstances.  It is less clear under the law of these states 
the circumstances under which an intervener can use deadly force against
a police official to aid a third party.  The Second Amendment provides a 
degree of uncomfortable clarity. 
VIII. THE RIGHT TO REBEL AND DEFENSE IN REBELLION 
Many commentators argue that applying the historical rationale underlying 
the Second Amendment to modern day times is a license for anarchy.369 
A reasonable inference from this approach suggests that “the people have 
a right to bear arms, in public, specifically to intimidate the police, and to 
use those weapons against the police in circumstances where they perceive 
their constitutional rights or the constitutional rights of others to have been 
violated, subject only to post-confrontation resolution by a court.”370 
A historical as well as a textual approach to the Second Amendment 
clearly suggests that an intervener has the right to use deadly force in the 
defense of a stranger.371 The defense, however, does not derive exclusively
from the right to self-defense.  That is, the defense-of-strangers doctrine 
is a recent addition to American criminal jurisprudence.  As such, the 
doctrine has slim historical roots in the Second Amendment.  However, 
the rationale behind the American common law right to resist an unlawful 
arrest provides a foundation for the argument that the Second Amendment 
embraces the defense-of-strangers doctrine. 
The English common law right to resist an unlawful arrest seems to be 
based on a doctrine quite discernible from the historical doctrine of self-
defense, although justifications for the right to resist an unlawful arrest 
have changed over time. The justification for the right began with the 
doctrine of provocation in Tooley, but changed to one of defense of liberty 
as the right developed in America.372  In Tooley, three strangers came to 
368. Id. at 179. 
369. Miller, supra note 169, at 966. 
370. Id.
 371. See U.S. Const. amend. II; People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). 
372.  The Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349; 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. 
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the aid of a woman who had been unlawfully arrested.373  One of the 
strangers, Tooley, ended up killing a man who came to the aid of the
arresting officer.374  The King’s Bench held that the unlawful arrest served 
as sufficient provocation to mitigate Tooley’s offense from murder to
manslaughter.375  The court considered the unlawful arrest an affront to 
the Magna Carta and, thus, an affront to all Englishmen, and considered
Tooley’s passion understandable.376  The King’s Bench’s conception of 
provocation resembled the doctrine of heat-of-passion manslaughter
codified in many state laws.377 
The rationale of provocation began to shift in American courts due to 
the obvious dangers in the provocation doctrine which, if left unaltered, 
would tend to suggest that any affronts to the American constitution––for 
example, racial discrimination or violations of the right of free speech–– 
could mitigate murders and, in some cases, excuse dangerous assaults.  As 
such, American common law developed another justification for the right. 
Under American common law, a person’s right to be free from 
unconstitutional physical restraint justified resistance to an unlawful
arrest.378  Many courts and scholars have interpreted such resistance as a 
form of self-defense.379  This characterization prompts strong arguments
that the modern trend abrogating the right to resist an unlawful arrest flies 
in the face of our Constitution.380  Such an interpretation would require
the repeal of many state statutes that make it unlawful to resist an unlawful
arrest. American law up until recently has always allowed for the use of
physical force to ward off threats of criminal deprivations of freedom,
whether those deprivations be kidnapping or unlawful arrest.381 
The best case supporting the proposition that the Second Amendment 
embraces a right to use deadly force to defend strangers against unlawful 
police violence involves a conceptual marriage between the self-defense 
component of the Second Amendment and the right to rebel, which is 
373. Id. at 349–50.
 374. Id. at 350. 
375. Id. at 352–53. 
376. Id. at 353. 
377. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West 2015). 
378. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 537–38 (1900) (holding that 
the defendant had the right to use such force as was absolutely necessary to resist an
attempted illegal arrest). 
379. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right To Carry Arms 
(I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U.  L.  
REV. 585, 591 (2012). 
380. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights,
Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 902– 
03 (1984). 
381. Bad Elk, 177 U.S. at 537–38. 
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implied by the plain language of the Second Amendment and evidenced
by the original justification for the ratification of the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms.
The right to bear arms rests on two foundational rights within the Second 
Amendment. These two rights, the right of self-defense and the right to 
rebel, are distinguishable. The right of self-defense, of course, involves a 
physical response to immediate physical threats to the safety of the party
invoking the right and his or her family.382 This right encompasses defense
against common assailants and burglars as well as police officials using 
excessive force.383 The right to self-defense is practical and fully functional. 
The right to rebel, on the other hand, is necessarily a quasi-abstract right 
that theoretically permits organized violence against the government should 
the government use or threaten constitutionally prohibited government
force to impose its will on the citizenry.384  The right to rebel further differs 
from the right of self-defense because it does not justify violence against 
private citizens, only agents of federal, state, or local governments. 
Understanding the nature and limitations of the right to rebel requires 
understanding the circumstances surrounding its ratification.  The Second 
Amendment was partially inspired by Eighteenth Century colonists’ 
pervasive fear of being defenseless in the face of potential government 
tyranny.385  The history aback the Second Amendment indicates that the
Framers sought to “deter tyranny and allow popular revolution to unseat
a tyrant.”386  Joseph Story stated that 
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against
the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are
successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over
them.387
 382. O’Shea, supra note 379, at 594. 
383. Id.
 384. See Tom Ginsburg et al., When To Overthrow Your Government: The Right To 
Resist in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184, 1203 (2013). 
385. See Alan Bedenko, The Second Amendment and Tyranny, ARTVOICE (Jan. 16, 
2013, 7:30 AM), http://blogs.artvoice.com/avdaily/2013/01/16/the-second-amendment­
and-tyranny [http://perma.cc/24H3-DZ86].
386. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU 
L. REV. 1359, 1390 (1998). 
387. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
746 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
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The Supreme Court in Heller observed with reference to the founders, 
“history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting
of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by 
taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army
to suppress political opponents.”388  Additionally, the English created the
English right to bear arms in part because a number of English monarchs 
had quashed dissent by disarming the English people.  Furthermore, in 
early American history, prior to the American Revolution, George III disarmed
certain areas in the American colonies that posed a threat to English rule.389 
This greatly influenced the founders’ ratification of the Second Amendment.
The Second Amendment seems on its face to create a collective right as 
opposed to an individual right, the primary purpose of which is to provide 
for the common defense of the citizenry against government oppression.
That is, the Second Amendment seems to only secure the right of citizens 
to bears arms in connection to their service in a militia organized for the 
common defense.  The plain language of the Second Amendment seems 
to support this interpretation.  The amendment reads, “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”390  The Supreme 
Court in Heller, however, determined that individuals had a right to bear 
arms for individual defense.391  Several scholars support this interpretation. 
For example, William Blackstone commented that the right to bear arms 
in English common law rights was rooted in “the natural rights of resistance 
and self-preservation” available to people “when the sanctions of society 
and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”392 
Similarly, David B. Kopel argues that 
[t]he Framers of the Constitution and the Second Amendment saw community
defense against a criminal government as simply one end of a continuum that 
began with personal defense against a lone criminal; the theme was self-defense,
and the question of how many criminals were involved (one, or a standing army)
was merely a detail.393 
Since the Second Amendment protects the rights of individuals acting in 
their own interests, the right to rebel is also an individual right, exercisable 
against individual government agents. 
388.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008). 
389. People & Events: Events Leading to the American Revolution, PBS (Mar. 30, 
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/patriotsday/peopleevents/e_conditions.html [http://perma. 
cc/ 8LS7-Q2NC] (last visited July 15, 2015). 
390. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
 391. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. 
392. BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *139. 
393. Kopel, supra note 386, at 1454 n.358. 
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Professor Darrell Miller argues that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s use of deadly force to combat unlawful, deadly police force 
because the use of defensive force under these circumstances amounts to 
a response to representative acts of government tyranny.394  He argues, 
“Individuals—not just communities—have the right to protect themselves 
from public violence. Individuals—not just the militia—have the right to 
defend themselves against tyranny.”395  Professor Miller also seems
to suggest that the Second Amendment also contains a right to defend
others as an extension of the doctrine of self-defense.396  He does not parse 
the question of whether a relationship with the defended party matters for 
constitutional purposes.397  Professor Miller also doesn’t distinguish the
right to rebel from self-defense.398  As discussed, however, the two doctrines
are not completely compatible.399  That is, based on the historical methodology 
the Supreme Court used in Heller and McDonald to determine that the
Second-Amendment codified the natural right of self-defense, the Second
Amendment contains no right to defend strangers.400 Said differently, the
lawful defense of a stranger from civilian violence is a relatively new 
invention in the Anglo-American legal tradition.  It is thus not a part of the 
“history and traditions” of American jurisprudence.  That said, if the 
Second Amendment does in fact sanction the use of physical force in
defense of a stranger, such a finding has no roots in the doctrine of self-
defense, but instead in the right to rebel. 
If the right to rebel retained its original implications, the result would 
be socially disastrous, particularly when the court’s individualization of 
the Second Amendment rights in Heller and McDonald are taken into 
account.401  That is, the reconciliation of the Court’s most recent interpretations
of the Second Amendment with the Framers’ original vision would essentially
provide that individuals have a right to attack government agencies and/ 
or officials if those agencies or officials use military or police force to 
suspend, abridge, or remove the citizens’ rights.  Because of this obvious 
impracticality courts should view the right to rebel as a dormant right that 
394. Miller, supra note 169, at 940. 
395. Id.; Williams, supra note 49, at 648. 
396. Miller, supra note 169, at 940.
 397. Id.
 398. Id.
 399. See supra Part II. 
400. See supra Part III. 
401. See supra notes 66, 103 and accompanying text. 
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only becomes active when combined with a tangible right, such as self-
defense, that defines and limits its scope. 
The right to rebel should be viewed as a right of last resort.  That is, the 
right to rebel should only allow citizens to take the law into their own 
hands against the government or against government agents when the 
government cannot fully protect a fundamental constitutional right or
make citizens whole after its violation.  In other words, only the violation
of a clearly defined constitutional right can activate the right to rebel, and 
only when subsequent judicial action could not fully redress such a
violation. The activation of the right to rebel by the doctrine of self-
defense provides the bases for the doctrine of defense-in-resistance. 
IX. UNLAWFUL POLICE VIOLENCE IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES 
The minority community may be most in need of Second Amendment 
protections, including defense-in-resistance.  That is, if the Second-
Amendment right of self-defense and third-party defense against police 
officers truly was created as a check on government tyranny and oppression,
then communities with the highest rate of unlawful police violence might 
be most in need of that check.402  Many members of these communities as
well as scholars and commentators view the police not as an organization
of public servants but as an occupying force present primarily to control 
the community through fear, intimidation, and incarceration.403 
This view is influenced by disproportionate instances of the abuse of 
police authority in communities of color.404  The abuse of police authority 
can be defined as “any action by a police officer without regard to motive, 
intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human dignity, 
manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a 
member of the police constituency in the course of performing ‘police 
work.’”405  The police physically abuse their authority when they use
unprovoked force, unnecessary force in controlling a situation, or excessive
force in conducting an arrest.406  Psychological police abuse consists of
verbal attacks, discrimination, intimidation, or harassment used to control 
402. See generally VICTOR E. KAPPELER ET AL., FORCES OF DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING 
THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING (2d ed. 1998) (citing research showing that minorities view 
police negatively).
403. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why 
the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 391–92, 
404, 407 (2002). 
404. Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing 
for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 690, 693–98 (1996). 
405. Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, Typology of Police Deviance, in  POLICE
DEVIANCE 3, 7 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter eds., 3d ed. 1991). 
406. Id. 
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or diminish the victim.407  Legal abuse consists of a violation of an 
individual’s rights under the U.S. Constitution, federal law, or state law.408 
In 2001, the United States Department of Justice found that around four
hundred and twenty two thousand people 16 years old and older were 
estimated to have contact with the police in which the police used physical 
force or threatened the use of physical force.409  A disproportionate 
amount of civil complaints filed against the police from these encounters 
were filed by African-Americans and Latinos.410  Moreover, most instances
of unlawful police violence go unreported.411  Whatever the case, it seems 
clear that Blacks are “disproportionately harassed, beaten and killed by
police.”412 
The phenomenon of physical police abuse, commonly referred to as 
police brutality, did not begin with the brutal beating of Rodney King by
several officers on a Los Angeles road way in 1991.413  As pointed out by 
Alexa P. Freeman, 
Police brutality is not a new phenomenon—rather, its setting has shifted. Many
scholars analogize police brutality today to lynchings in the past. The analogy is 
apt. For nearly a century following the Emancipation of slaves in the United
States, law enforcement officials not only condoned lynchings, but in many instances
participated in them.414 
Additionally, as discussed, after the Civil War, law makers had to invoke 
the Second Amendment in order to make an effort to stop rogue southern 
police officers from disarming and then abusing black union soldiers returning 
home from the war.415
 407. Id. at 7–8. 
408. Id. at 8. 
409. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 
2 (2001), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tv=pbdetail&iid=659 [http://perma.cc/TMW6­
DHCB]. 
410. Malcom D. Holmes, Minority Threat and Police Brutality: Determinants of 
Civil Rights Criminal Complaints in U.S. Municipalities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (2000). 
411. Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(Dec. 1, 1997), https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_
immigrants-rights/fighting-police-abuse-community-ac [http://perma.cc/M3P2-VJPX].
 412. Freeman, supra note 404, at 696. 
413. Id. at 690; see Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police Revives Charges of 
Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/07/us/tape-of­
beating-by-police-revives-charges-of-racism.html [http://perma.cc/MZ99-3PMR].
 414. Freeman, supra note 404, at 690. 
415. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying notes. 
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Police brutality, as is the case with lynchings, must be assessed through 
the context of race, if it is to be understood and ameliorated.  Historically, 
the police have enforced white supremacy416 through fear, intimidation,
physical attack, and incapacitation.417 In fact, the police have been compared 
by at least one scholar to the slave-time overseers, who used various forms 
of abuse to control the slave population.418 
The racial stereotyping of black and Latino men helps to perpetuate 
police violence in communities of color.419  There exists a widely-held 
belief in society that blacks, in particular, are more prone to crime and are 
generally more dangerous than any other race.420  This is evidenced most 
starkly by the phenomenon of mass incarceration.  Mass incarceration, as 
discussed most cogently by Professor Michele Alexander in The New Jim 
Crow is an “evolved” method of containing young Latino and African-
American males, replacing the more “primitive” tactics used during slavery
and Jim Crow.421  In fact, there are more African-Americans involved in
the criminal justice system today than there were slaves in 1850.422 
Prior to 1973, there were approximately 100 inmates per 100,000 American
Citizens.423  However, the rate increased to an exponential five multiples
of that by 2005.424 There are now over 500 inmates per 100,000 citizens.425 
Between 1980 and 2011, the number of those imprisoned for drug offenses 
416. See generally Jared Sexton, Race, Nation, and Empire in a Blackened World, 
95 RADICAL HIST. REV. 250 (2006). 
417. Freeman, supra note 404, at 692–93. 
418. Donald F. Tibbs, From Black Power to Hip Hop: Discussing Race, Policing, 
and the Fourth Amendment Through the “War on” Paradigm, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST. 47, 74–75 (2012). 
419. Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young +
Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 623–25 (1993). 
420. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent 
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787–89 (1994); see also 
Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use 
of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 571–74 (1993)
(arguing that the jury in the Rodney King case viewed King as dangerous because they
believed he possessed superhuman strength which needed to be brought under control). 
421. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012).  As Alexander plainly states, “[r]ather than rely on race, we use 
our criminal justice system to label people of color ‘criminals’ and then engage in all the 
practices we supposedly left behind [during the era of Jim Crow].  Today it is perfectly
legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal to 
discriminate against African Americans.”  Id. at 2. 
422. Id. at 180. 
423. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 5 (2007). 
424. Id.
 425. Id. 
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has increased from about 40,000 to approximately 500,000.426  On average, 
the United States incarcerates people at a rate more than seven times the 
combined rate of England, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada.427 
Furthermore, as pointed out by professor Dorothy Roberts, “On any 
given day, nearly one-third of black men in their twenties are under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system—either behind bars, on probation, 
or on parole.”428 African-Americans make up only about thirteen percent 
of the population but represent forty percent of the incarcerated.429 The
vast majority of imprisoned blacks have been incarcerated for drug offenses.430 
In 1998, African-Americans represented seventy-four percent of all Americans 
imprisoned for drug-related offenses.431  In fact, in several states, African-
American males make up to ninety percent of the entire prison population 
convicted on drug offenses.432 
What’s more is that there is little evidence to suggest that blacks are 
more likely to commit drug offenses than their white counterparts.433  In
fact, the U.S. Public Health Service Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration found that in 1992, fourteen percent of all drug 
users were African-Americans, eight percent Latino and an astounding 
seventy-six percent white.434 Similarly, there is no real evidence to suggest
that African-Americans are more likely to be drug-dealers, as it is a fact
that most users buy drugs from individuals who share their race and socio­
426. See  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 3 (2014), http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TLF5-A4U4].
 427. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, U.S.  
RATES OF INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (2006). 
428. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004). 
429. Jennifer R. Wynn, Inside Rikers: The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration in
the Twenty-First Century, 51 JUDGES’ J., no. 4, 2012, at 23, 25. 
430. Nunn, supra note 403. 
431. Dan Pens, Federal Prisons Erupt, in  THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE
LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY 246–47 (Daniel Burton-Rose et. al. eds., 1998)
(“[P]ossession of 500 grams of powdered cocaine—100 times the amount of crack—carries 
a five year mandatory minimum [sentence] . . . in reality a racist war being waged against 
poor Blacks.”). 
432. Wynn, supra note 429, at 4. 
433. Nunn, supra note 403, at 395. 
434. Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L.  REV. 839, 
845–46 (2002). 
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economic status.435  In the face of this reality, in 1989, an astonishing four
African-American males were arrested as compared to one of their white 
counterparts.436 A 2013 study by the American Civil Liberties Union found
that African-Americans were 3.73 times more likely to be arrested on 
marijuana possession than their white counterparts, despite the fact that 
both races use the drug in roughly the same amounts.437 
It would seem that the African-American community’s perception of 
the police is not unwarranted. That is, the evidence suggests that the mass
incarceration of blacks is explained by discriminating law enforcement.438 
In addition to the disparities mentioned above, African-Americans are 
more likely to be investigated.439  Police officials, like much of America, buy 
into racial stereotypes and are thus more likely to find African-Americans
criminally suspicious than other groups.440  As such, law enforcement
officials focus a disproportionate amount of attention on African-Americans
and are more likely to use excessive force, including deadly force, on 
African-American men.441  An uneven use of excessive police force in 
minority communities tends to suggest that these communities are in 
greater need of Second Amendment protections than other American 
communities.442  Maybe Black Panther Party-type police patrols are needed, 
particularly in the African-American community, to check unlawful police
violence.443  If so, the Second Amendment makes even the extreme ends
of these types of patrols potentially lawful. 
Many will argue that community patrols and defense-in-resistance will 
only result in the death of more black males.  It is more likely that these 
patrols combined with a widespread understanding of Second Amendment 
defensive rights will decrease black deaths. It should do so in two ways. 
435. K. JACK RILEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, CRACK, POWDER COCAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS IN
SIX U.S. CITIES 15–16 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167265.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/N747-5JLR]. 
436. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
us0309web_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6JQ-VK47] (“[B]etween 1988 and 1993, blacks were 
arrested at rates more than five (between 5.1 and 5.5) times the rate of whites.”). 
437. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4 
(2013), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/061413-mj-report-rfs-rel4.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PA8­
ARUZ].
 438. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1489–91 (2000). 
439. Id.
 440. Gaynes, supra note 419, at 623–25. 
441. Id. at 625. 
442. KAPPELER ET AL., supra note 402, at 6–8. 
443. Mary D. Powers, Civilian Oversight Is Necessary To Prevent Police Brutality, 
in POLICING THE POLICE 56, 57 (Paul A. Winters ed., 1995). 
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Firstly, it will decrease police violence for reasons mentioned above.  It 
also might indirectly decrease the incidents of black-on-black killings by
increasing a sense of community empowerment.  Such a sense of community 
empowerment prevailed in the late Sixties and early Seventies through 
what is known as the Black Power Movement.  The Black Power Movement 
was a response to the integrationist approach to racial injustice, an approach 
that dominated the mid to late Sixties.  This approach was symbolized
most cogently by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  In the late sixties, however,
the African-American community began to evolve its response to white 
supremacy.  The prevailing ethos became one of self-determination 
as opposed to assimilation.  An ideology developed that championed the
development of black political, social, cultural and economic institutions 
to secure black interests.444  The slogans “Black Pride” and “Black Power”
defined the day.  This burgeoning community cohesiveness gave purpose 
to many young African Americans, who began to focus their attention on 
the larger issues that faced their communities and away from the
differences that divided the community.  The Black Power Movement,
however, waned with the targeted and strategic disruption of Black Power 
organizations by the FBI.445 As one scholar notes, “there is much fallout
from the war on Black Power, namely the over-incarceration of young 
Black men, police brutality, unconstitutional searches and seizures, and 
racial profiling . . . .”446  Thus, a return to a more overt form of community 
empowerment, such as community police patrols and intervention, should 
help to re-focus the angst of minority youth to issues of greater moment
than the internecine rivalries that beget the bulk of black-on-black violence.
The Second Amendment as recently interpreted in McDonald and 
Heller provides the vehicle for the effective use of community patrols and 
444. JOSEPH W. SCOTT, THE BLACK REVOLTS: RACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE
U.S.A.: THE POLITICS OF ESTATE, CASTE, AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN SOCIETY 152–53 
(1976).
 445. S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt. 2, at 11–12 (1976), http://www.intelligence.senate. 
gov/pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf [http://perma.cc/3VSE-BCVG].  The gang culture that has created
so much black-on-black violence is partially the result of the government’s organized and 
strategic efforts to dismantle African-American groups and neutralize African-American
leaders who threatened the status quo.  Id. This effort was led by J.Edgar Hoover and was 
employed as early as the 1920’s against Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro 
Improvement Association. UNIV. PUBL’NS OF AM., FEDERAL SURVEILLANCE OF AFRO­
AMERICANS (1917-1925): THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE RED SCARE, AND THE GARVEY
MOVEMENT, at ix–x (Theodore Kornweibel, Jr. ed., 1985), http://cisupa.proquest.com/ 
ksc_assets/catalog/1359_FedSurveillAfroAms.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EER-WS2F]. 
446. Tibbs, supra note 418, at 79. 
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intervention. State statutes that describe the right to defend in resistance 
will provide further clarity and thus will help empower citizens to 
challenge individualized government tyranny in their communities. 
X. STATUTORY MODEL 
The Second Amendment affords a right to use deadly force against police 
officials under limited circumstances.447 The right’s scope, however, is
unclear. This Article proposes a statutory model that approximates the 
constitutional floor regarding the right.  In a modern society, any statutory
model should balance the constitutional right to defend in resistance with 
the necessity of having an effective police force.  Society has a great interest 
in discouraging the use of force against public servants.  Without the modern 
police force, society would almost certainly be in shambles.  It would be 
anarchy.  A statutory model that encourages violence against the police,
as the statute adopted by the state of Indiana does arguably, while certainly 
holding true to this nation’s founding traditions, may not serve its current
needs.448  However, codifying the right to act with defensive force against 
public servants does in some instances outweigh its detriments. 
Excessive police force is as prevalent as ever.  The abuse of police 
power not only harms the direct victims of the abuse, but also delegitimizes 
the government’s authority in the eyes of many citizens.  Codifying the 
right to use deadly force against public servants acts as a check on police 
abuse. Public servants are less likely to use excessive force, particularly
deadly force, if it is clear that citizens can defend against such force.
Furthermore, the codification of the right to defend in resistance encourages 
community monitoring of law enforcement.  Community monitoring is 
more likely to curb the use of excessive force.  The police may be more 
hesitant to use unlawful force in front of a group of bystanders if it is clear 
that those bystanders can intervene. 
The codification of the right to defend in resistance has clear benefits. 
On the other hand, an undiluted right to defend in resistance may serve to 
hamper law enforcement and expose officers to unjustified attacks.
Additionally, the codification of the right may, similar to the common law 
right to resist an unlawful arrest, increase the danger to both the perceived 
victim and the intervener.  That is, intervention may escalate the use of
police force instead of abating it.  However, this is a cost many are willing 
to risk in defense of themselves and their communities.  Furthermore, the 
history of the Second Amendment suggests that the net result of defense­
447. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
 448. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2013). 
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in-resistance would be a decrease in police brutality and other forms of 
police violence in the African-American community. 
Any statutory model circumscribing the right to defend in resistance 
must also take into account the Supreme Court’s decisions allowing police 
officials to use deadly force on fleeing suspects and other constitutionally 
sanctioned uses of deadly force.  That is, the question of whether a 
constitutional right, grounded in the common law, exists to use deadly
force against a police official must reckon with the Supreme Court’s more 
recent holdings regarding the constitutionality of using deadly police 
force on fleeing suspects.  These decisions seem to signal a departure from 
the common law in that they elevate the station of law enforcement, and
generally tolerate law enforcement’s use of extreme force more than common
law does. So any analysis of how the Supreme Court will interpret the right
of defense-in-resistance must take into account the Court’s current regard
for police force.
The Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner held that police officials 
could use deadly force on a fleeing suspect if the police reasonably believed 
that the suspect posed a danger to officers or the public at large.449 As 
such, the use of deadly force could be factually in error, thus possibly 
triggering defensive rights under the Second Amendment, and lawful at
the same time under Garner. Thus, a statute, like the Indiana statute, that
contains no alter ego rule may encourage interveners to use deadly force 
even when law enforcement uses deadly force lawfully but wrongly. 
Consider a scenario where a robber, in the process of robbing a bank, 
has shot three people. Then he conceals his gun in his waistband and flees 
the bank on foot. A description of the culprit is sent across police radio 
and a uniformed police officer sees a man running who reasonably 
matches the description of the robber. He knows the robber is armed and
dangerous and has shot three people.  The officer gives chase on foot with 
his weapon un-holstered. He commands the suspect to stop and threatens 
to fire his weapon if he does not.  The suspect, who is actually not the
robber, is deaf and cannot hear the officer.  Another individual, coming
out of a convenience store, sees what he perceives to be an unarmed man 
running and smiling as if he is unaware that he is being chased by the 
officer. The officer fires a shot and misses.  The suspect continues running 
as he cannot hear the gun firing. The officer shoots again and misses.  At 
this point, the onlooker pulls his gun and shoots the officer, who he believes 
449.  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4 (1985). 
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is acting unlawfully by firing at an unarmed man.  The onlooker hits and
mortally wounds the officer.  In this scenario, the officer arguably used a
constitutionally acceptable degree of force under the circumstances. What
will be intervener’s fate? He sincerely believed the officer was acting 
unlawfully and that he had to act to save the life of a citizen.  Indiana would
not hold him criminally responsible. However, by statutorily mandating that
the intervener has to witness the police force and that the intervener acts 
at his or her own risk, the statutory model decreases the likelihood that an
intervener would act in error. 
What if a state refuses to recognize defense-in-resistance?  The argument
should be anticipated that some states will argue that issues of crimes and
criminal defenses are the exclusive province of the states.  In fact, there 
are several Supreme Court decisions that seem to enforce this view.450 
However, all of these decisions preceded the Supreme Court’s holdings in
McDonald and Heller.  In prior cases, the Supreme Court analyzed issues 
concerning state criminal defenses under the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause.451  The Supreme Court in those cases tends to suggest that 
a state can allow or disallow any defense it likes.452 However, the Supreme
Court has not heard a case involving whether a state can eradicate completely,
self-defense as a defense. Even prior to Heller it goes without question
that the Supreme Court would have deemed such an abridgment to be 
unconstitutional.  Furthermore, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Graham 
v. Conner, the Court only uses the substantive due process clause when 
no other constitutional amendment speaks to the issue.453 Here, the Second 
Amendment clearly speaks to the issue of self-defense proclaiming it to 
be the central component of the Second Amendment.  As such, the floor 
of the Second Amendment governs self-defense and defense-in-resistance 
by way of the latent right to rebel. 
The statutory model for defense-in-resistance is as follows: 
A person is justified in using force, including deadly force, in defending a third-
party against the unlawful assault of a public servant, if that person is a witness
to the circumstances giving rise to the unlawful use of police force and if such 
force is necessary to protect the third-party from immediate and serious bodily
injury or death. 
The proposed statue has five important aspects:
 450. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 (1987). 
451. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710; Martin, 480 U.S. at 233. 
452. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710; Martin, 480 U.S. at 233. 
453.  Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
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1.	 The public servant must actually be in the process of using force before 
the intervener can act;
2.	 The intervener must be correct in his or her belief that the public servant 
is using unlawful force; 
3.	 The intervener must have witnessed the circumstances giving rise to the 
use of police force; 
4.	 The defended party has to be facing immediate injury; and 
5.	 The threatened physical injury must be serious. 
The above model would help fill in the gap left by the Supreme Court
decisions in Heller and McDonald, provide guidance to state legislatures 
in developing similar statutes, and empower minority communities in 
particular to take a more active role in the protection of their communities.
XI. CONCLUSION 
Heller established self-defense as a core component of the Second 
Amendment.454  However, the existence of the Second Amendment right
to defend in resistance hinges not on the doctrine of self-defense, but on 
the implicit right to rebel. 
This Article posited that the Second Amendment encompasses a right
to rebel against tyrannical government action.  However, this right, if
extended to its logical extreme, would undermine social order.  Therefore, 
the right has to be limited.  Limiting the right to rebel to situations where 
it would vindicate clearly defined constitutional rights that are not fully
redressable by judicial action provides an appropriate boundary. This 
Article proposed that the right of self-defense limits the intervener’s right 
to rebel.  An individual can only use defensive force against a public servant 
in defense of a stranger when the use of defensive force constitutes resistance 
to individuated acts of government tyranny. This type of defense is not
self-defense but defense-in-resistance.
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment establishes the right to defend in resistance, it has not defined
the scope of this right.  The statutory model provided above limits the 
circumstances under which defensive force can be used against public 
servants while safeguarding the right to defend in resistance.
Due to the history of police violence and abuse in minority communities, 
particularly the African-American community which has little political 
recourse, the constitutional right to form community police patrols and to 
454.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 564 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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use physical force to defend members of the community against 
disproportionate, unlawful police violence, may be these communities’
final hope of resisting a society that has historically sought to control and 
diminish them. 
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